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From Bad to Worse 
ASSESSING THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF 
FOUR CONTROVERSIAL FCC DECISIONS 
Rob Frieden† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Far too many major decisions of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) rely on flawed 
assumptions about the current and future telecommunications 
marketplaces. When the FCC incorrectly overstates the current 
level of competition,1 it risks exacerbating its mistake going 
forward if actual competition proves unsustainable or 
lackluster. In many key decisions, the FCC cited robust 
competition in current and future markets as the basis for 
deregulatory decisions that relax restrictions on incumbents, 
abandon strategies for promoting competition, or apply 
statutory definitions of services that trigger limited 
government oversight.2 If the FCC has confidence in the 
  
 † Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, 
Pennsylvania State University; email: rmf5@psu.edu. 
 1 “[T]here is substantial competition in the provision of Internet access 
services.” In re AT&T Inc. & BellSouth Corp., Application for Transfer of Control, 22 
FCC Rcd. 5662, 5724-25 (Mar. 26, 2007) (memorandum opinion and order). In 2008 the 
FCC stated that “advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all 
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.” In re Inquiry Concerning the 
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a 
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 9615, 
9616 (June 12, 2008) (fifth report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-08-88A1.pdf. On the other hand, at about the same time the FCC 
stated that “[s]tudy after study demonstrates that our nation’s broadband 
infrastructure lags dramatically behind other industrialized nations. In order to 
reverse this trend, we must encourage ‘third pipe’ technologies to provide some at least 
some [sic] challenge to the cable/telco broadband duopoly in our cities.” In re 
Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of 
the Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, 21 FCC Rcd. 6703, 6727 
(June 2, 2006) (order on reconsideration of the second report and order). 
 2 An FCC conclusion that robust competition exists provides the basis for a 
reviewing court to affirm the Commission’s decision that it can deregulate. For 
example, the FCC abandoned rules requiring incumbent carriers to make available 
local switching and routing services to market entrants based on the determination 
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viability and permanence of competition, then reviewing courts 
will likely refrain from second-guessing the Commission and 
uphold its deregulatory initiative. In its zeal to announce 
deregulatory decisions and to accrue political dividends, the 
Commission ignores secondary and tertiary consequences of 
decisions that deprive it of the jurisdiction and flexibility 
needed to respond to technological and marketplace changes.3  
Ironically, the FCC has not promoted competition. It 
has exacerbated the trend toward concentration of ownership 
generated by technological convergence and the real (or 
perceived) need for incumbents to grow larger by acquiring 
competitors. Instead of making sure that this trend does not 
lead to oligopolistic behavior, which can harm consumers,4 the 
  
that newcomers could survive in the marketplace by acquiring facilities from other 
competitors, or by paying full wholesale rates: “[T]he presence of robust competition in 
a market where CLECs use critical ILEC facilities by purchasing special access at 
wholesale rates . . . precludes a finding that the CLECs are ‘impaired’ by lack of access 
to the element under § 251(c)(3).” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 593 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (the FCC should not implement statutory requirements that incumbent 
carriers cooperate with market entrants when the Commission determines that 
adequate marketplace competition exist). 
 3 For example, the FCC has expressed confidence that it can assert its 
ancillary jurisdiction to achieve consumer protection even if it previously opted to 
streamline or eliminate regulatory safeguards.  
We have a duty to ensure that consumer protection objectives in the Act are met 
as the industry shifts from narrowband to broadband services. Through this 
Notice, we thus seek to develop a framework for consumer protection in the 
broadband age—a framework that ensures that consumer protection needs are 
met by all providers of broadband Internet access service, regardless of the 
underlying technology. This framework necessarily will be built on our ancillary 
jurisdiction under Title I; as we explain in the Order, this jurisdiction is ample to 
accomplish the consumer protection goals we identify below, and we will not 
hesitate to exercise it. 
In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,929-30 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Wireline 
Broadband Classification Order] (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
“We emphasize that we will not hesitate to adopt any non-economic regulatory 
obligations that are necessary to ensure consumer protection and network security and 
reliability in this dynamically changing broadband era.” Id. at 14,915. 
 4 A duopoly controls the broadband Internet access marketplace in the 
United States. 
Cable and DSL providers currently control almost 98 percent of the residential 
and small-business broadband market. More than one quarter of consumers have 
only one choice between cable and DSL, and even in markets with both services 
available, customers usually face a duopoly, with one choice for each type of 
service. Under any economic standard “nearly every regional broadband market 
is very highly concentrated.” The problem this situation generates is really very 
simple to grasp: in order to “reach” the logical and content layers, one has to “pass 
through” the physical layer; whoever controls the physical layer, unless restricted 
by law, becomes a gatekeeper for all other layers; and scarcity of physical layers 
means more control, and ability to realize that control, for fewer gatekeepers.  
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FCC has removed still-necessary regulatory safeguards 
designed to curb market power without robbing ventures of 
opportunities to operate efficiently. Intentionally or not, the 
FCC has contributed to market concentration5 even as it 
abandoned lawful techniques and policies to monitor and 
remedy likely marketplace abuses.6 
The FCC has embraced economic and political theory 
supporting reliance on marketplace forces without a complete 
empirical confirmation that industry self-regulation can occur. 
The Commission infers the existence of adequate competition 
and concludes that such competition will persist even though 
economic, technological, and future regulatory decisions might 
favor industry concentration and unsustainable competition. 
Information, communications, and entertainment markets 
  
Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from 
Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2008) (citations omitted). “So long 
as wireline Internet access remains a closed duopoly controlled by the incumbent LEC 
and the incumbent cable company, the FCC will need to step in as the ‘traffic cop’ for 
ensuring nondiscriminatory Internet access.” Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, 
Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for 
Net Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 120 (Dec. 2010). 
 5 “Even with one less nationwide mobile telephone carrier to choose from, 
U.S. consumers continue to benefit from robust competition in the CMRS marketplace.” 
In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Commercial Mobile Services, 21 FCC Rcd. 10,947, 11,029 (Sept. 29, 2006) (eleventh 
report) (dismissing any adverse impact from Sprint’s merger with Nextel). 
 6 It took the FCC over four years to detect and remedy over $52 million of 
deliberate data-service overcharges imposed by Verizon Wireless. See In re Verizon 
Wireless Data Usage Charges, 25 FCC Rcd. 15,105 (Oct. 28, 2010) (order). Because the 
charges refer to Internet access, Verizon arguably could have claimed the FCC lacked 
jurisdiction to intervene, based on the assertion that all forms of Internet access 
constitute information services. See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (Mar. 15, 2002) 
(declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). The FCC rejected the assertion 
by Verizon and other wireless carriers that it lacked jurisdiction to compel the carrier 
to provide data service to subscribers of other carriers.  
Because encouraging data roaming serves the public interest by promoting 
connectivity for, and ubiquitous access to, mobile broadband as well as facilitating 
consumer access to wireless broadband data coverage nationwide, the obligations 
set forth above are reasonably ancillary to the Title III provisions to manage 
spectrum, allocate, assign, and to establish spectrum usage conditions in the 
public interest as set forth above. 
In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, 5442 n.176 
(Apr. 7, 2011) (second report and order); Maisie Ramsay, Verizon Sues FCC over Data 
Roaming Rules, WIRELESS WEEK (May 18, 2011), http://www.wirelessweek.com/News/ 
2011/05/Policy-and-Industry-Verizon-Sues-FCC-Data-Roaming-Rules-Legal/. 
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favor large enterprises able to exploit economies of scale7 and 
scope.8 Technological and marketplace convergence supports 
the ability of large firms to offer bundles of services previously 
offered on a single, standalone basis. Additionally, the FCC’s 
willingness to conditionally approve mergers and acquisitions 
also leads to industry consolidation. 
The FCC’s deregulatory decisions operate in one 
direction—the elimination of regulatory safeguards—typically 
without reserving any lawful and effective option to reassert 
safeguards should assumptions prove wrong or circumstances 
change. For example, the FCC’s decision to classify all Internet 
access technologies9 as information services10—consequently 
  
 7 Economies of scale refers to the ability of a single firm to offer goods and 
services at the lowest cost by increasing its size. “[A]n increase in inputs leads to a 
proportionally greater increase in outputs (for example, a doubling of inputs would lead to 
more than a doubling of outputs).” Kevin G. Wilson, Deregulating Telecommunications and 
the Problem of Natural Monopoly: A Critique of Economics in Telecommunications Policy, 14 
MEDIA CULTURE & SOC. 343, 345 (1992). “Declining levels of average cost accompanying 
greater expansion of product output and optimal use of plant and equipment. Cost 
advantages associated with the increasing size of firms.” MEDIA ECONOMICS THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, Glossary 286 (Alison Alexander et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).  
Scale economies refer to lower average costs from producing a larger quantity of 
output. A more technical definition is that economies of scale exist at a particular 
range of output when the long run average total cost decreases as output expands. 
Scale economies can be a barrier to entry if entrants are likely to acquire fewer 
customers and sell less output than the incumbent, and the resulting higher 
average cost for the entrants makes it difficult for them to compete with the 
incumbent, particularly if retail prices are close to the incumbent’s average cost. 
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange 
Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 17,028, n.245 (2003) (report and order and order on 
remand and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (citations omitted). 
 8  
Economies of scope exist when one firm can produce two or more products at a 
lower total cost than if each product were produced separately by different firms. 
Scope economies can be a barrier to entry if entrants are unable to produce and 
sell all of the products the incumbent produces, and the resulting higher cost 
makes it unprofitable to enter the market. 
Id. at 17,029, n.246. 
 9 The FCC has determined that various broadband technologies for 
accessing the Internet all qualify for limited regulatory oversight. See, e.g., In re 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and their Facilities, 
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967 (2005); Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,855. 
 10 An information service is defined as  
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include 
any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a 
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reducing oversight of Internet Service Providers’ (ISPs) 
network management—now prevents the Commission from 
responding to complaints that some ISPs have interfered with 
subscribers’ Internet traffic. Should an ISP, such as Comcast, 
deliberately disrupt subscribers’ traffic,11 which can offer a 
competitive alternative to the company’s pay-per-view video-
programming services,12 the FCC has no direct statutory 
authority to sanction the company for engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct.13 Worse yet, the decision to treat basic 
bit transmission as an information service severely restricts 
the Commission’s ability to impose safeguards on services that 
combine Internet access with software to provide the functional 
equivalent of a regulated service (e.g., Voice over the Internet 
Protocol (VoIP)14 and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV)).15 The 
  
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications 
service. 
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).  
 11 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 
13,028 (Aug. 20, 2008) (memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Comcast 
Sanction], order vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 12 Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have 
become a competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because Internet users 
have the opportunity to view high-quality video with BitTorrent that they might 
otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television. Such video distribution poses a 
particular competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand (VOD) service. Comcast 
Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,030.  
 13 See Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 568 (2010); 
Edward B. Mulligan V, Note, Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network Management 
Regulation Back on Track, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 633, 635 (2010); Courtney Erin Smith, 
Comment, Net Neutrality, Full Throttle: Regulation of Broadband Internet Service 
Following the Comcast/BitTorrent Dispute, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 587 (2010).  
 14 VoIP is the real-time carriage and delivery of data packets that correspond 
to voice. VoIP services range in quality, reliability, and price and can link both 
computers and ordinary telephone handsets. For technical background on how VoIP 
works, see Susan Spradley & Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges 
Associated with the Evolution to VoIP, FCC (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.fcc.gov/events/ 
tutorial-technical-challenges-associated-evolution-voip. See generally Charles J. Cooper 
& Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The Case for Preemptive 
Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 293 (2008).  
 15 IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download 
video files or view (streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. In re 
Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Emergency Petition for Temporary Standstill, DA 10-679, 25 
FCC Rcd. 3879 (2010). Some of the available content duplicates what cable television 
subscribers receive therein triggering disputes over whether cable operators can secure 
exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service provider from 
distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been providing its subscribers with 
certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a half years, including the 
Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the 
Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant part of its 
service offering.” Id. at 3879-80. For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The 
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FCC’s decision to apply the information-service classification to 
all Internet-access technologies means that the Commission 
has abandoned direct statutory authority to resolve problems 
and, in the future, must resort to questionable ancillary 
jurisdiction16 to resolve legitimate complaints and impose 
necessary regulatory safeguards. 
There are other instances of unintended consequences 
resulting from decisions based on the FCC’s overly optimistic 
findings and assumptions about marketplace competition: 
removing caps on the total spectrum a single wireless carrier 
can control;17 abandoning local loop unbundling18 and other 
  
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal 
Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and 
Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009). 
In addition, [Local Exchange Carriers] are increasingly utilizing Internet Protocol 
Television (“IPTV”) technologies. Verizon’s FTTH [fiber to the home] network, 
marketed under the brand name “FiOS,” allows delivery of multichannel video 
services, in addition to telephony and high-speed Internet access service. At the end 
of 2006, Verizon reported that it offered video programming via FiOS to more than 
2.4 million households in 200 cities in 10 states and served 207,000 subscribers. 
In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 548 (Jan. 16, 2009) (thirteenth annual report); 
see also In-Sung Yoo, supra, at 204. 
 16 Ancillary jurisdiction refers to an inference of statutory authority to impose 
rules and regulations based on indirect statutory authority. For example, the FCC asserted 
jurisdiction over cable television operators because the importation of distant broadcast 
television signals could have had an adverse financial impact on directly regulated 
television broadcasters. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); see also 
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 696-709 (1979); United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649, 659-70 (1972).  
 17 In re 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for 
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 16 FCC Rcd. 22,668 (Nov. 18, 2001) (report and order). 
 18 Telecommunications carriers have  
[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the 
provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network 
elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, 
and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and 
section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such 
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to 
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.  
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2006); see also In re Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499 (Aug. 8, 1996) 
(first report and order), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 
U.S. 366 (1999); In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (Nov. 5, 1999) (third report and 
order and fourth further notice of proposed rulemaking), rev’d and remanded, United 
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Review of the Section 
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 16 FCC Rcd. 
22,781 (Dec. 20, 2001); In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978 (Aug. 21, 2003) (report and 
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structural separation requirements;19 and concluding that 
incumbent carriers have no duty to deal with market entrants, 
even when the incumbent prices the wholesale rate charged to 
competitors above retail rates.20 For each of these decisions, the 
FCC compounded its initial mistakes by foreclosing the option 
to make necessary and lawful future modifications.  
This article will examine the consequences of the FCC’s 
wishful thinking about the viability of current competition and 
the sustainability of competition going forward. The article 
concludes that flawed fact finding and market projections had 
adverse initial consequences but have even worse future 
impacts. In response to aggressive incumbent advocacy, 
impatient lawmakers keen on deregulation, and deferential 
judges willing to rely on the Commission’s expertise,21 the FCC 
has contributed to the development of a telecommunications 
industry structure that is less competitive,22 innovative, 
available,23 affordable, and responsive than what exists in many 
  
order and order on remand and further notice of proposed rulemaking), corrected by 
Errata, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003), vacated and remanded in part, aff’d in part, United 
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 19 The FCC eliminated Title II and structural separation requirements applicable 
to wireline broadband Internet-access services offered by facilities-based providers and gave 
providers discretion to offer the underlying wireline broadband transmission on a common-
carrier basis. Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3. 
 20 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-57 
(2009) (no supplemental antitrust relief available when the FCC determines that a 
carrier has no duty to deal with a competitor). 
 21 To avoid “legislating from the bench” or second guessing the technical 
expertise of the FCC, reviewing courts typically defer to the Commission: 
Our task on review is therefore limited. We review the FCC’s action in this case 
only to ensure that it is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). That standard is 
particularly deferential in matters such as this, which implicate competing policy 
choices, technical expertise, and predictive market judgments. 
Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572 F.3d 903, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Time Warner Telecom, 
Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 221 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 22 “Unfortunately, the U.S. is lagging behind much of the rest of the world in 
terms of broadband service available to its citizens. As we move into a world in which 
‘everyone will use the Internet for everything’ this country runs the risk of not being 
competitive.” RICHARD ADLER, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, NEWS CITIES: THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF HEALTHY INFORMED COMMUNITIES 27 (2011), available at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/cands/News_Cities_The_
Next_Generation_of_Healthy_Informed_Communities.pdf. 
 23 For example, even though the United States has the most broadband lines 
in use it only ranks 15th in terms of broadband market penetration (subscribers per 
100 inhabitants) based on statistics compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development on national broadband and telecommunications market 
penetration. See OECD Broadband Portal, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/54/ 
0,3746,en_2649_33703_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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other countries.24 The FCC’s follies provide a clear warning to 
other national regulatory authorities: embracing political and 
economic doctrine at the expense of unbiased fact finding and 
empirical analysis generates bad decisions that trigger even 
worse long-term outcomes. 
Part II of this article will identify four FCC decisions that 
started a major deregulatory campaign based on unqualified 
conclusions about the existence and sustainability of competition. 
Section A examines the Commission’s decision to treat Internet 
access as an unregulated information service. Section B tracks the 
Commission’s deregulatory glide path for common carriers, 
including decisions to abandon precompetitive interconnection 
and access-pricing requirements as well as structural safeguards 
that separate carriers’ telecommunications and information 
services. This section, emphasizing antitrust and traditional 
duties to deal, also considers how reviewing courts respond to 
FCC deregulation and the Commission’s assumptions about 
market competitiveness. Section C examines the marketplace 
consequences of the FCC’s decision to allow wireless carriers to 
acquire unlimited spectrum regardless of the impact on market 
entry by new competitors. Part III offers conclusions on the short- 
and long-term consequences of premature deregulation when the 
marketplace has insufficient competition and market actors do 
not self-regulate. 
II. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE TO THE FUTURE  
On numerous occasions spanning several decades, the 
FCC has decided to abandon or reduce regulatory oversight. 
Technological innovations, changed circumstances, and a host 
of legitimate reasons can support selective deregulation. 
However, a significant number of initiatives, four of which are 
examined in depth in this article, were wrong at the outset. 
When the FCC makes a bad call, the normal checks and 
balances in government are supposed to provide remedies (e.g., 
judicial review). But well-argued rationales, coupled with 
shared views on economic doctrine and judicial deference to 
FCC expertise,25 can prevent appellate review from reversing 
  
 24 See International Comparison Requirements Pursuant to the Broadband 
Data Improvement Act, International Broadband Data Report, IB Docket No. 10-171, 
Second Report, 26 FCC Rcd. 7378 (May 20, 2011) (second report). 
 25 Supreme Court Justice Scalia shows how the FCC can exploit judicial 
deference to engage in policymaking outside its lawful jurisdiction: 
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bad decisions. Once in play, these decisions can trigger 
secondary and tertiary consequences that the FCC might not 
have predicted—consequences that, over time, compound the 
harm caused by the initial decision. 
The four decisions examined in this article show how the 
FCC has engaged in results-driven decision making that lacks 
empirical support and uses legally unsustainable rationales to 
bolster preordained results. Authors of these decisions have 
emphasized stakeholder-submitted data without much close 
scrutiny by Commission staff or third-party peer review.26 In the 
absence of independently generated data, the FCC has had to 
rely largely on stakeholder-submitted materials that support a 
particular outcome. Such reliance prevents the Commission 
from generating a realistic assessment based on a thorough and 
critical evaluation of all submissions, coupled with in-house fact 
finding and analysis. The agency has a statutory obligation to 
compile a complete factual record27 and to accord interested 
parties opportunities to participate.28 However, the Commission 
  
This is a wonderful illustration of how an experienced agency can (with some 
assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic 
discretions. The main source of the Commission’s regulatory authority over 
common carriers is Title II, but the Commission has rendered that inapplicable in 
this instance by concluding that the definition of “telecommunications service” is 
ambiguous and does not (in its current view) apply to cable-modem service. It 
contemplates, however, altering that (unnecessary) outcome, not by changing the 
law (i.e., its construction of the Title II definitions), but by reserving the right to 
change the facts. Under its undefined and sparingly used “ancillary” powers, the 
Commission might conclude that it can order cable companies to “unbundle” the 
telecommunications component of cable-modem service. And presto, Title II will 
then apply to them, because they will finally be “offering” telecommunications 
service! Of course, the Commission will still have the statutory power to forbear 
from regulating them under § 160 (which it has already tentatively concluded it 
would do, Declaratory Ruling 4847–4848, ¶¶ 94–95). Such Möbius–strip reasoning 
mocks the principle that the statute constrains the agency in any meaningful way. 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1013-14 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the FCC’s rationale for considering cable 
modem service as lacking a standalone telecommunications service and noting how 
some reviewing courts fail to scrutinize closely the Commission’s analysis).  
 26 See generally Rob Frieden, Case Studies in Abandoned Empiricism and the 
Lack of Peer Review at the Federal Communications Commission, 8 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 277 (2010). 
 27 “[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be 
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” FCC v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding statutory requirement that 
satellite master antenna television system operators secure a franchise if they link 
separately owned buildings or use public rights of way constitutional even though 
single building service had no such franchising requirement). 
 28 See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 231 (2008) 
(FCC “failed to satisfy the notice and comment requirement of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (‘APA’) by redacting studies on which it relied in promulgating the rule 
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has primarily relied on the more comprehensive filings of the 
parties who have the most to gain or lose in a proceeding. It 
becomes easy for the FCC to rely on nonempirical data compiled 
by stakeholders that purport to supply data, but who in reality 
advocate for a desired outcome regardless of whether the facts 
support this objective. 
A. Unconditional Conclusion that Broadband Access 
Constitutes an Information Service 
The FCC has determined that the legislatively crafted 
information-service classification29 applies to Internet access 
provided via cable modems,30 digital subscriber line (DSL) 
service,31 the electrical power grid,32 and wireless networks.33 
The Commission accrued short-term political dividends from 
such determinations because the determinations showed 
regulatory restraint and endorsed marketplace self-
regulation.34 Whether the result of wishful thinking, inflexible 
  
and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its choice of the extrapolation factor 
for” predicting how quickly broadband over powerline (BPL) emissions attenuate or 
weaken); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006).  
 29 Information service is defined as,  
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any 
use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.  
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).  
 30 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4821 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice 
of proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78 (2005). 
 31 Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,863. 
 32 In re United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding 
the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information 
Service, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,281 (Nov. 7, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order). 
 33 In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (Mar. 23, 2007) (declaratory ruling). 
 34 FCC managers are keenly aware of the political consequences resulting 
from changes in policy. 
[I]n examining rulemaking and transitions in all three branches of government 
from the agency’s perspective, it may be most helpful to consider how the agency 
analyzes the costs and benefits of rulemaking. This cost-benefit calculation is 
quite different than the one typically discussed in administrative law—whether a 
particular regulation has net benefits to society. Instead, the calculation considers 
the net benefits of a rulemaking, both in terms of substance and process, to an 
agency in light of the particular costs to the agency. On the benefit side, the 
agency may care about the regulatory outcome; budgetary, political, and status 
rewards; and judicial deference. On the cost side, the agency may worry about 
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adherence to libertarian economic doctrine, or fair-minded 
interpretation of applicable statutes, the FCC determined that it 
must apply a single, mutually exclusive service classification.35 
Under this either/or doctrine, the FCC opted to abandon any 
direct statutory foundation for mandating fair and open Internet 
access. Soon after these decisions, the FCC confronted instances 
where self-regulation did not prevent anticompetitive practices. 
Comcast, for example, interfered with the broadband traffic 
generated by some subscribers in ways that evidenced the 
incentive and ability to distort competition in the video-
programming retail market.36 As discussed later in this section, 
Comcast, lacking effective FCC oversight, unilaterally thwarted 
subscriber access to competitive alternatives to the company’s 
pay-per-view video content.37 
With an eye toward freeing the Internet of government 
oversight, the Commission applied the substantially less 
restrictive information-service classification to all types of 
Internet-access services based on the view that the 
  
regulatory outcome; budgetary, political, and status fallout; and reversal by the 
courts. 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 471, 487 (2011); see also, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: 
An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008). 
 35 In its quest to deregulate all broadband options, the FCC opted to treat 
wireless Internet access as an information service even though subscribers use a single 
handset for making telephone calls and accessing the Internet: 
We conclude, as the Commission did in the Universal Service Order, that the 
categories of “telecommunications service” and “information service” in the 1996 Act 
are mutually exclusive. Reading the statute closely, with attention to the legislative 
history, we conclude that Congress intended these new terms to build upon 
frameworks established prior to the passage of the 1996 Act. Specifically, we find 
that Congress intended the categories of “telecommunications service” and 
“information service” to be mutually exclusive, like the definitions of “basic service” 
and “enhanced service” developed in our Computer II proceeding, and the definitions 
of “telecommunications” and “information service” developed in the Modification of 
Final Judgment that divested the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T. 
In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,507-08 
(Apr. 10, 1998) (report to Congress) (citations omitted). “Although the Commission has 
not been entirely consistent on this point, we agree for the wireline broadband Internet 
access described in this Order with the past Commission pronouncements that the 
categories of ‘information service’ and ‘telecommunications service’ are mutually 
exclusive.” Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,862 n.32.  
 36 Comcast Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,055-56. 
 37 “Comcast’s practice selectively blocks and impedes the use of particular 
applications, and we believe that such disparate treatment poses significant risks of 
anticompetitive abuse.” Id. at 13,055.  
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telecommunications38 component needed to transmit bits and 
packets is inseparable from the content those bits contain.39 By 
treating the telecommunications component as subordinate, 
the Commission could rationalize a semantic distinction 
between a carrier providing telecommunications as a 
component of an information service and a carrier offering 
retail telecommunications services on a standalone basis.40 By 
opting to treat the telecommunications function as wholly 
  
 38 Telecommunications is defined as “the transmission, between or among 
points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in 
the form or content of the information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006). 
 39 To justify its decision to apply the information-service classification to 
services that combine telecommunications transmission and content, the FCC insisted 
that the telecommunications component could not be singled out: 
[W]e reject arguments that companies using their own facilities to provide 
wireline broadband Internet access service simultaneously provide a 
telecommunications service to their end user wireline broadband Internet access 
customers. The record demonstrates that end users of wireline broadband 
Internet access service receive and pay for a single, functionally integrated 
service, not two distinct services. This conclusion also is consistent with certain 
past Commission pronouncements that the categories of “information service” and 
“telecommunications service” are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the fact that the 
Commission has, up to now, required facilities-based providers of wireline 
broadband Internet access service to separate out a telecommunications 
transmission service and make that service available to competitors on a common 
carrier basis under the Computer Inquiry regime has no bearing on the nature of 
the service wireline broadband Internet access service providers offer their end 
user customers. We conclude now, based on the record before us, that wireline 
broadband Internet access service is, as discussed above, a functionally 
integrated, finished product, rather than both an information service and a 
telecommunications service. 
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,911 (citations omitted). 
 40 The Supreme Court accepted the FCC’s determination that cable modem 
Internet access constituted an information service: 
Cable modem service is not itself and does not include an offering of 
telecommunications service to subscribers. We disagree with commenters that 
urge us to find a telecommunications service inherent in the provision of cable 
modem service. Consistent with the statutory definition of information service, 
cable modem service provides the capabilities described above “via 
telecommunications.” That telecommunications component is not, however, 
separable from the data-processing capabilities of the service. As provided to the 
end user the telecommunications is part and parcel of cable modem service and is 
integral to its other capabilities. 
In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4823 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of 
proposed rulemaking), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Brand X Internet Servs. v. 
FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). See generally Rob Frieden, 
Neither Fish nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services, 
6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373 (2008); Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and 
Information Services Have in Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory 
Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 (2006). 
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integrated into an information-service composite, the FCC 
could then abandon conventional common-carrier regulation 
required by Title II of the Communications Act.41  
In the short term, the Commission championed 
regulatory restraint, a laudable goal that arguably contributed 
to the Internet’s speedy commercial success.42 However, the 
Commission soon discovered that—having given up on a direct 
statutory link—it would experience great difficulty in imposing 
any lawful safeguards, even when it received complaints of 
clearly abusive, discriminatory, and anticompetitive practices 
like those undertaken by Comcast.43 
The FCC appeared quite confident that it could remedy 
any miscalculations and improper deregulation simply by 
invoking ancillary jurisdiction to revisit and revise its prior 
deregulation if consumer protection and other compelling 
circumstances warranted.44 In hindsight, the Commission acted 
too summarily both in its decision to deem all forms of Internet 
access exempt from Title II oversight and its assumption that it 
could readily undo, revise, or reassemble a limited regulatory 
regime if necessary.  
When faced with instances where it had to remedy a 
problem (or make another information-service/telecommunications-
service determination), the FCC has generated a mixed record. In 
some instances reviewing courts have deferred to the Commission’s 
  
 41 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276.  
 42 Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52 from Tim Wu, Assoc. 
Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 4 (August 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.timwu.org/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
 43 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘[T]he 
allowance of wide latitude in the exercise of delegated powers is not the equivalent of 
untrammeled freedom to regulate activities over which the statute fails to 
confer . . . Commission authority.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. 
FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1976))); Comcast Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,030-31. 
 44 The FCC overestimated its ability to apply Title I ancillary jurisdiction to 
re-regulate information services after having previously determined that it lacked 
statutory authority:  
The Commission is empowered by statute to weigh these various objectives and 
craft regulations that specifically target the relevant features of VoIP and other 
IP-enabled services. Where the Act does not prescribe a particular regulatory 
treatment, the Commission may have authority to impose requirements under 
Title I of the Act. Alternatively, the Commission may forbear from applying 
specific provisions. Finally, of course, the Commission is entitled to amend or 
revoke its own rules and regulations when the underlying circumstances no 
longer apply. 
In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863, 4893 
(Mar. 10, 2004). 
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expertise and affirmed the assertion of jurisdiction45 and rules (e.g., 
requiring VoIP service providers to comply with many conventional 
telephone company requirements46) despite the absence of direct 
statutory authority under Title II of the Communications Act. 
But in other cases, where equally compelling needs existed for 
the FCC to provide consumer safeguards, courts have deemed 
the Commission to lack sufficient statutory authority to act (e.g., 
sanctioning Comcast for deliberately preventing subscribers 
from transmitting and receiving video content via peer-to-peer 
traffic streams).47 
Having made an unconditional determination that the 
information-service, deregulated “safe harbor”48 applies to 
Internet access, the Commission could not subsequently 
reassert regulatory safeguards—no matter how necessary. 
When the FCC determined that only the information-service 
classification would apply, the Commission in effect 
determined that it had no direct statutory authority to impose 
regulatory requirements on telecommunications and other 
noninformation services that constitute a part of the blend of 
services contained in broadband Internet access. Even if the 
FCC could belatedly identify legitimate reasons for its 
  
 45 See, e.g., Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 46 See, e.g., In re IP-Enabled Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 10,245 (June 3, 2005) 
(first report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom. Nuvio Corp. 
v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring interconnected VoIP service providers 
to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities); In re Universal Service Contribution 
Methodology, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518 (June 27, 2006) (report and order and notice of 
proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom. in relevant part, Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 
489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (establishing universal service contribution obligations 
for interconnected VoIP service providers); In re Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer 
Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information; IP-Enabled 
Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 22 FCC Rcd. 
6927 (2007) (extending customer proprietary network information obligations to 
interconnected VoIP service providers), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecom. Assoc. v. 
FCC, 555 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 47 See generally Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 48 A safe harbor constitutes “[a]n area or means of protection [or a] provision 
(as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). In light of the lack of a bright line distinction 
between regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information 
services, ventures can possibly secure a competitive advantage through regulatory 
arbitrage where ventures seek reduced regulatory oversight by characterizing 
telecommunications services as information services. The FCC defined regulatory 
arbitrage as “businesses making decisions based on regulatory classifications rather 
than on customers’ preferences and innovative and sustainable business plans.” In re 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4846 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking). See generally Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in 
Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2004).  
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intervention, the prior determination that cable, DSL, 
powerline, and wireless services qualified for deregulated safe 
harbors rendered them effectively off limits.49 
The FCC wrongly concluded that the broadband 
Internet access marketplace was so competitive that no 
provider would try to engage in anticompetitive practices. In 
reality the broadband marketplace offers limited options to 
most U.S. consumers with cable modem and DSL services 
predominating.50 Rather than making a proper deregulatory 
statutory interpretation, the FCC opined—incorrectly—that 
industry self-regulation would force carriers to offer low-cost 
  
 49 The Supreme Court rejected the FCC’s attempt to impose limited regulatory 
safeguards on information-service providers based on an extension of ancillary jurisdiction: 
In this case we must decide whether the Federal Communications Commission 
has authority to regulate an Internet service provider’s network management 
practices. Acknowledging that it has no express statutory authority over such 
practices, the Commission relies on section 4(i) of the Communications Act of 
1934, which authorizes the Commission to “perform any and all acts, make such 
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, 
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). The 
Commission may exercise this “ancillary” authority only if it demonstrates that 
its action—here barring Comcast from interfering with its customers’ use of peer-
to-peer networking applications—is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective 
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.” Am. Library Ass’n v. 
FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Commission has failed to make that 
showing. It relies principally on several Congressional statements of policy, but 
under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit case law statements of policy, by 
themselves, do not create “statutorily mandated responsibilities.”  
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644. 
 50 The FCC has overstated the level of broadband competition in the United 
States.  
Contrary to claims of those who feel the U.S. has “robust broadband competition,” 
it is clear that half of the states have a duopoly rather than true competitive 
markets. The only question for these states is how much of a market share the top 
two providers collectively command. In states such as Ohio and Nevada, where 
there is a 30+ percentage gap between the top two providers, some will argue this 
is a monopoly. The other contention, that consumers and businesses have a wealth 
of options for providers (one industry executive estimated “everyone has at least 
four wireless carries, plus cable, satellite” etc.), also has flaws. This is perhaps true 
when taking in the nation as a whole, but when analyzed at the state and county 
levels which is where in reality the selection of possible providers actually exists, 
there are far fewer choices. Even in the most competitive states, the bottom five 
competitors have 3% market share or less. These competitors are obviously not 
offering services throughout their states, so clearly any remaining providers are 
less than a competitive force. Furthermore, if others are adding dial up service 
providers to their list of consumer choices, this is disingenuous distraction because 
consumers know dial-up is Internet access but it isn’t broadband. 
ADAM ELLIOTT & CRAIG SETTLES, THE STATE OF BROADBAND COMPETITION IN 
AMERICA—2010 (2010), available at http://gigaom.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/pdf-
broadband-competition-research-report-4-22-10-final.pdf.  
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rates and refrain from engaging in anticompetitive conduct.51 In 
every instance where a regulatory safeguard has appeared 
necessary, explicitly or implicitly, for an information service, 
the FCC has had to scramble to find a lawful basis to reassert 
jurisdiction. This process has forced the FCC to spend countless 
hours devising creative and not-always-successful ways to 
backtrack from its previously clear and unequivocal 
determination. One example is the FCC’s attempt to sanction 
Comcast for deliberately interfering with its subscribers’ peer-
to-peer file transfers, which contained some identical content to 
the company’s pay-per-view cable television service.52 The 
Commission determined that Comcast did not have legitimate 
traffic-management reasons for meddling with subscriber 
traffic53 and that the company lacked candor in its 
representation of what tactics it had used.54 Notwithstanding 
the commonly shared view that Comcast’s conduct justified 
FCC investigation and a remedy to safeguard consumers, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the FCC’s attempt to 
invoke ancillary jurisdiction as the lawful basis for sanctioning 
Comcast. The court determined that the FCC lacked a direct 
statutory basis for intervening: 
In this case the Commission cites . . . [no section in the 
Communications Act of 1934] to shed light on any express statutory 
delegation of authority found in Title II, III, VI, or, for that matter, 
anywhere else. That is, unlike the way it successfully employed 
policy statements in Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I, the 
Commission does not rely on section 230(b) or section 1 to argue that 
its regulation of an activity over which it concededly has no express 
statutory authority (here Comcast’s Internet management practices) 
is necessary to further its regulation of activities over which it does 
have express statutory authority (here, for example, Comcast’s 
  
 51 Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,884-85 (discussing 
sufficiency of intermodal competition and price decline as a result of that competition).  
 52 “[T]he evidence reviewed above shows that Comcast selectively targeted 
and terminated the upload connections of its customers’ peer-to-peer applications and 
that this conduct significantly impeded consumers’ ability to access the content and use 
the applications of their choice.” Comcast Sanction, supra note 11, at 13,054.  
Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have become a 
competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because Internet users 
have the opportunity to view high-quality video with BitTorrent that they might 
otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television. Such video distribution poses a 
particular competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand (“VOD”) service.  
Id. at 13,030. 
 53 Id. at 13,050. 
 54 “Comcast’s statements in its comments and response to Free Press’s 
complaint raise troubling questions about Comcast’s candor during this proceeding.” 
Id. at 13,032 n.31.  
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management of its Title VI cable services). In this respect, this case 
is just like NARUC II. On the record before us, we see “no 
relationship whatever,” NARUC II, 533 F.2d [601,] 616, between the 
Order and services subject to Commission regulation.55 
Faced with a clear rebuke, FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski attempted to fashion a rationale for subdividing 
broadband access so that the Commission could identify and 
apply limited regulation of now identifiable telecommunications 
service components.56 This newfound severability of 
telecommunications services ran completely counter to the FCC’s 
previous rationale used to apply the information-service 
classification unconditionally to broadband Internet access. The 
Commission previously recognized the need for a 
telecommunications link to provide bit-and-packet transmission 
across distances; however, the Commission determined that this 
component was not a standalone retail service because it was 
seamlessly integrated with a predominant information service.57 
The Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s statutory interpretation, 
which served as the basis to treat cable modem Internet access as 
an information service.58 
  
 55 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 654. 
 56 See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The Third 
Way: A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.doc (proposing to 
apply Title II regulation only to the bit transmission portion of ISP services and 
rejecting a renewed attempt to find a way to extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or 
reclassifying all aspects of Internet access as a telecommunications service); see also 
Austin Schlick, General Counsel, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, A Third-Way Legal 
Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297945A1.doc (providing legal 
rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority over 
Internet access). 
 57 To support its finding that broadband Internet access constitutes an 
information service, the FCC subordinated the telecommunications transport function 
and emphasized the nature of what content subscribers receive: 
Thus, whether a telecommunications service is being provided turns on what the 
entity is “offering . . . to the public,” and customers’ understanding of that service. 
End users subscribing to wireline broadband Internet access service expect to 
receive (and pay for) a finished, functionally integrated service that provides 
access to the Internet. End users do not expect to receive (or pay for) two distinct 
services—both Internet access service and a distinct transmission service, for 
example. Thus, the transmission capability is part and parcel of, and integral to, 
the Internet access service capabilities. Accordingly, we conclude that wireline 
broadband Internet access service does not include the provision of a 
telecommunications service to the end user irrespective of how the service provider 
may decide to offer the transmission component to other service providers.  
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,910-11. 
 58 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
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This newfound ability to segregate and identify a new 
telecommunications component to Internet access service is a 
scramble and a stretch. Previously, the Commission conveniently 
and expediently argued no such segregation could occur. The FCC 
subsequently abandoned this strategy and now asserts that it can 
still intervene and respond to complaints about ISP conduct based 
on other creative and novel interpretations of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended.59  
Ostensibly structured to offer an acceptable compromise, 
the FCC issued a Report and Order that imposes basic public-
interest obligations on ISPs,60 including four principles established 
in a 2005 statement61 and requirements that ISPs operate with 
transparency, nondiscrimination, and a commitment not to block 
lawful traffic.62 The Commission identified exceptions for 
reasonable network management,63 specialized services,64 and 
  
 59 In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (Dec. 23, 2010) 
(report and order) [hereinafter Open Internet Report and Order]; see also In re 
Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064 (Oct. 22, 2009) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking) [hereinafter Open Internet NPRM]. 
 60 Specifically, the FCC imposed rules on the providers of broadband Internet 
access service, defined as a  
mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to 
transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, 
including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the 
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term 
also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be providing a 
functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is 
used to evade the protections set forth in this Part. 
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,932. 
 61 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (Sept. 23, 2005) (policy statement). 
 62 The FCC attempts to couch its open access initiative as consistent with 
prior bipartisan actions:  
[W]e adopt three basic rules that are grounded in broadly accepted Internet norms, 
as well as our own prior decisions: i. Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband 
providers must disclose the network management practices, performance 
characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services; ii. No 
blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, 
services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful 
websites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony 
services; and iii. No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may 
not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic.  
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,906.  
 63 “A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and 
tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account 
the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access 
service.” Id. at 17,952 (differentiating between reasonable network management 
practices that could affect how subscribers access content and unreasonable 
discriminatory practices).  
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wireless access.65 Notwithstanding its prior decision to apply the 
information-service classification that requires the FCC to eschew 
regulatory oversight, the Commission emphasized that the public-
interest duty to ensure an open Internet required it to establish 
clear and certain rules applicable to both fixed (i.e., wire-based) 
and mobile (i.e., wireless) ISPs.66 
Having faced instances where it saw the need to 
intervene and resolve complaints about unfair and 
anticompetitive practices of a major national ISP, the FCC 
presented compelling arguments to impose public-interest 
safeguards.67 But in concluding that retail ISPs operate as 
information-service providers, the Commission acted on the 
assumption that an ISP like Comcast would never engage in 
such practices because robust competition would punish such 
self-serving conduct with substantial customer migration to 
alternative carriers promising not to interfere with customers’ 
broadband traffic. 
The FCC’s Open Internet Report and Order would 
obligate all ISPs to “disclose [their] network management 
practices, performance characteristics, and terms and 
  
 64 “‘[S]pecialized services,’ such as some broadband providers’ existing 
facilities-based VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ from broadband 
Internet access service . . . .” Id. at 17,965.  
We will closely monitor the robustness and affordability of broadband Internet 
access services, with a particular focus on any signs that specialized services are in 
any way retarding the growth of or constricting capacity available for broadband 
Internet access service. We fully expect that broadband providers will increase 
capacity offered for broadband Internet access service if they expand network 
capacity to accommodate specialized services. We would be concerned if capacity 
for broadband Internet access service did not keep pace. We also expect broadband 
providers to disclose information about specialized services’ impact, if any, on last-
mile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access 
service. We may consider additional disclosure requirements in this area in our 
related proceeding regarding consumer transparency and disclosure. 
Id. at 17,966.  
 65 Despite the likelihood that wireless network access will grow and perhaps 
become the primary way people access the Internet, the FCC established relaxed anti-
blocking rules based on spectrum and operational limitations not applicable to wire-
based networks.  
A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing 
lawful websites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such 
person block applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video 
telephony services, subject to reasonable network management. 
Id. at 17,959. 
 66 Id. at 17,908. 
 67 See id. 
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conditions of their broadband services.”68 The FCC adopted 
different requirements for fixed and broadband providers on 
the other two key requirements. Fixed providers may not 
unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network 
traffic, nor can they block lawful content, applications, services, 
or nonharmful devices.69 Mobile broadband providers may not 
block access to lawful websites or applications that compete 
with their voice or video services.70  
The Report and Order rejects assertions that network 
neutrality71 requirements would stifle innovation, reduce 
  
 68 Id. at 17,906.  
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall 
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management 
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access 
services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such 
services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings. 
Id. at 17,937.  
 69 “A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access 
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network 
management.” Id. at 17,942. 
 70 Id. at 17,959-60. 
 71 Network neutrality refers to the imposition of nondiscrimination, 
transparency, and other requirements on ISPs. The requirements are designed to 
foster a level, competitive playing field among content providers and to establish 
consumer safeguards so that Internet users have access limited only by legitimate 
concerns such as ISP network management and national security. See Rob Frieden, A 
Primer on Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS: REV. EUR. ECON. POL’Y 4, 5 (2008). 
See generally Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-
Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Dan G. Barry, 
The Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP 
Convergence Mean that It Is Time for Net Neutrality Regulation?, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421 (2008); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, 
Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 J. INTERNET L., 
No. 6, 1 (Dec. 2008); Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet Neutral: Net Neutrality 
and its Role in Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 153 (2008); T. Randolph Beard et al., Network Neutrality and Industry 
Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2007); Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, A 
Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 1 (2007); Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to 
the Network Neutrality Debate, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 461 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network 
Neutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2007); Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van 
Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A 
Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, 
Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 575 (2007); Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended Consequences of Net 
Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2007); Randolph J. May, 
Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, I/S: A J. L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 197 (2007); Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Justice, and Only 
Justice, You Shall Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137 (2007); Howard A. 
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incentives to invest in network infrastructure, and hamper 
employment in the Internet economy:  
We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of 
reasonable network management, will empower and protect 
consumers and innovators while helping ensure that the Internet 
continues to flourish, with robust private investment and rapid 
innovation at both the core and the edge of the network. This is 
consistent with the National Broadband Plan goal of broadband 
access that is ubiquitous and fast, promoting the global 
competitiveness of the United States.72 
Despite the strident dissents from the two Republican 
Commissioners, the Report and Order appears to emphasize 
that the final rules logically follow from the nonpartisan 
consensus reached in documents created in 2005 and 2007.73 
Further, the Report and Order claims that the requirements do 
  
Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating with More Questions Than Answers, 6 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2007); Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality 
to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. 
L. REV. 483 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of 
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006); Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of 
Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103 (2006); William G. Laxton, Jr., 
The End of Net Neutrality, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. NO. 15; Lawrence Lessig, In 
Support of Network Neutrality, I/S: A J. ON L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 185 (2007); J. 
Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the 
Internet, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 349 (2006); Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates 
Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 
3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network 
Neutrality, 19 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating 
Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End 
Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, 
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2003); Mark A. Lemley 
& Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in 
the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).  
 72 Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,906. 
 73 The FCC attempts to frame the Open Internet Report and Order as 
noncontroversial and a lawful exercise of statutory authority: 
The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt today 
follow directly from the Commission’s bipartisan Internet Policy Statement, 
adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily enforceable for certain 
broadband providers in 2005 and 2007; openness protections the Commission 
established in 2007 for users of certain wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry 
in 2007 that asked, among other things, whether the Commission should add a 
principle of nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement. Our rules build 
upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers to be 
transparent in their network management practices, so that end users can make 
informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and maintain Internet-
based offerings. The rules also prevent certain forms of blocking and 
discrimination with respect to content, applications, services, and devices that 
depend on or connect to the Internet. 
Id. at 17,907-08 (citations omitted). 
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not violate the Constitution,74 particularly First Amendment 
expression rights of ISPs75 and the prohibition on government 
takings in the Fifth Amendment.76  
Additionally, the Report and Order extensively attempts 
to demonstrate that the FCC has lawful jurisdiction to 
promulgate network neutrality rules, primarily because 
Congress, in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act,77 
authorized the FCC to take all reasonable steps to promote 
widespread access to the Internet.78 In light of the Comcast 
case, the Commission must establish clear and direct statutory 
authority to impose new rules.79 The Commission heavily relied 
on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act,80 which does not 
explicitly authorize regulation and rule making.81 The FCC 
inferred that the duty to encourage the deployment of 
“advanced telecommunications capability” authorizes the 
Commission to use whatever tools it considers necessary to 
achieve timely progress.82  
The FCC’s assumption of statutory authority requires 
two novel reinterpretations of the definition of 
telecommunications contained in the Communications Act. 
First, the FCC has to consider advanced telecommunications 
capability to include Internet access,83 despite having 
  
 74 See id. at 17,981-87.  
 75 See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How 
Internet Service Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral 
Conduits, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1314-15 (2010). 
 76 Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,985. 
 77 Section 706 is reproduced in the notes to Section 157 of the 
Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 157 notes (2006).  
 78 See Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,966-81.  
 79 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 80 Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,968. 
 81 See 47 U.S.C. § 1302. 
 82 The FCC inferred that Section 706 of the 1996 Act confers broad authority 
to revise the scope of regulatory oversight to promote Internet access: 
As noted, Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along with state 
commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment of “advanced 
telecommunications capability.” . . . Under Section 706(a), the Commission must 
encourage the deployment of such capability by “utilizing, in a manner consistent 
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” various tools including 
“measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or 
other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.”  
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,968. 
 83 “‘[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,’ as defined in the statute, 
includes broadband Internet access.” Id. at 17,968 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) 
(defining “advanced telecommunications capability” as “high-speed, switched, 
broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive 
high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any 
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previously concluded that the technologies providing such 
access constitute information services that only integrate 
telecommunications (but do not constitute telecommunications 
services in and of themselves). The Commission previously 
determined that the telecommunications transmission of bits 
and packets in Internet access is not severable from the 
predominant information service offered, but instead provided 
as a subordinate part of an information service that an ISP 
offers to end users.84 Second, the FCC now has to elevate the 
significance of the telecommunications bit-transmission 
function in Internet access85 to trigger public-interest concerns 
about competition and anticompetitive practices, even though 
the Commission had previously qualified Internet-access 
technologies for an unregulated safe harbor status. Now the 
FCC wants to validate the telecommunications component as 
the driver for public-interest regulatory safeguards.  
Despite having previously concluded that the broadband 
marketplace was robustly competitive and close to ubiquitous, 
the Commission cited to better-calibrated market penetration 
data to support its involvement: 
Section 706(b) of the 1996 Act provides additional authority to take 
actions such as enforcing open Internet principles. It directs the 
  
technology”)); In re A National Broadband Plan for our Future, 24 FCC Rcd. 4342, 4345-
46 (Apr. 8, 2009) (notice of inquiry). “The term ‘advanced telecommunications capability’ 
is defined, without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, 
switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and 
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any 
technology.” 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1); see also id. at n.19. (“advanced telecommunications 
capability” includes broadband Internet access); In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment 
of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and 
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, 2400 (Jan. 28, 1999) 
(report) (Section 706 addresses “the deployment of broadband capability”).  
 84 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 977-78 (2005).  
 85 Note that before the FCC deregulated Internet access, the Commission 
considered it possible to separate the telecommunications component:  
We conclude that advanced services are telecommunications services. The 
Commission has repeatedly held that specific packet-switched services are “basic 
services,” that is to say, pure transmission services. xDSL and packet switching are 
simply transmission technologies. . . . An end-user may utilize a 
telecommunications service together with an information service, as in the case of 
Internet access. In such a case, however, we treat the two services separately: the 
first service is a telecommunications service (e.g., the xDSL-enabled transmission 
path), and the second service is an information service, in this case Internet access. 
In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,012, 24,029-30 (Aug. 6, 1998) (memorandum and opinion 
and order, and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
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Commission to undertake annual inquiries concerning the 
availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans and requires that, if the Commission finds that such 
capability is not being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion, 
it “shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such 
capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by 
promoting competition in the telecommunications market.” In July 
2010, the Commission “conclude[d] that broadband deployment to all 
Americans is not reasonable and timely” and noted that “[a]s a 
consequence of that conclusion,” Section 706(b) was triggered. 
Section 706(b) therefore provides express authority for the pro-
investment, pro-competition rules we adopt today.86 
Additionally, the FCC applied portions of Titles II, III, 
and VI of the Communications Act to ISPs despite the fact that 
Title II customarily applies to common carriers, Title III to 
broadcasters and wireless carriers, and Title VI to cable 
television operators.87 Instead of stating that ISPs operate as 
telecommunications service carriers when they provide 
essential first and last-mile access to the Internet—a scenario 
suggested by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski and now 
apparently rejected—the Report and Order states that because 
some Internet-based services compete with traditional 
telephone, broadcast, and video services, the Commission has 
jurisdiction to impose rules and regulations to prevent 
anticompetitive practices and to promote competition.88 
The FCC justified the imposition of network neutrality 
rules on ISPs with the conclusion that ISPs have the incentive 
and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices that limit 
Internet openness in terms of content, applications, services, 
and devices accessed over, or connected to, broadband Internet 
access services.89 The Commission provided three examples 
suggesting that ISPs may have incentives to block or degrade 
content that competes with what the ISP or an affiliate offers, 
to impose surcharges on competing content providers in 
addition to end user subscription fees, and to degrade 
competitors’ traffic: 
[1] [B]roadband providers may have economic incentives to block or 
otherwise disadvantage specific edge providers or classes of edge 
providers, for example by controlling the transmission of network 
traffic over a broadband connection, including the price and quality 
of access to end users. A broadband provider might use this power to 
  
 86 Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,972. 
 87 Id. at 17,972-80.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 17,907. 
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benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the expense of unaffiliated 
offerings.90 
. . . .  
[2] [B]roadband providers may have incentives to increase revenues 
by charging edge providers, who already pay for their own 
connections to the Internet, for access or prioritized access to end 
users. Although broadband providers have not historically imposed 
such fees, they have argued they should be permitted to do so. A 
broadband provider could force edge providers to pay inefficiently 
high fees because that broadband provider is typically an edge 
provider’s only option for reaching a particular end user. Thus 
broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers.91 
. . . .  
[3] [I]f broadband providers can profitably charge edge providers for 
prioritized access to end users, they will have an incentive to 
degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service they provide 
to non-prioritized traffic. This would increase the gap in quality 
(such as latency in transmission) between prioritized access and non-
prioritized access, induce more edge providers to pay for prioritized 
access, and allow broadband providers to charge higher prices for 
prioritized access. Even more damaging, broadband providers might 
withhold or decline to expand capacity in order to “squeeze” non-
prioritized traffic, a strategy that would increase the likelihood of 
network congestion and confront edge providers with a choice 
between accepting low-quality transmission or paying fees for 
prioritized access to end users.92 
The FCC considers the three examples of discrimination 
as more than theoretical in light of actual examples where 
ISPs, such as Comcast, have blocked or degraded traffic 
without legitimate network management concerns.93 Similarly, 
  
 90 Id. at 17,915. 
 91 Id. at 17,919.  
 92 Id. at 17,922.  
 93 Content providers also may have the ability and incentive to interfere with end 
user Internet access. For example, to bolster its negotiation leverage with Cablevision on the 
amount of compensation due for the right to retransmit broadcast television content, Fox 
briefly blocked Cablevision broadband subscribers from accessing the company’s content 
made available via Hulu’s website. Fox used packet-interrogation techniques to identify 
which content requests made via the Hulu web site originated from Cablevision subscribers. 
See Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast’s Actions, 
BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 29, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20101129006456/en/Level-3-Communications-Issues-Statement-Comcast%E2%80%99s-
Actions; Letter from Joseph W. Waz, Jr., Senior Vice President, External Affairs & Pub. 
Policy Counsel & Lynn R. Charytan, Vice President, Legal Regulatory Affairs, Comcast, to 
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/1/1/About/PressRoom/Documents/Comcastexparte11
30.pdf; see also Joe Waz, 20 Q’s—with Accurate A’s—About Level 3’s Peering Dispute, 
COMCAST VOICES (Dec. 7, 2010), http://blog.comcast.com/2010/12/20-qs---with-accurate-as---
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the Commission has stated that the benefits in guarding 
against such anticompetitive practices outweigh the costs.94 
The FCC’s latest attempt to circumvent its information-
service classification of broadband Internet access may not 
pass muster with a reviewing court.95 The Commission avoided 
repeating the Title I ancillary jurisdiction strategy as well as 
Chairman Genachowski’s proposed surgical removal of 
telecommunications-service elements from information 
services. But the Commission has come up with similarly 
triangulating strategies: Title III confers broad authority for 
the FCC to impose any necessary safeguard over spectrum-
using services—arguably including wireless broadband96—and 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 both 
encourages and authorizes any well-articulated rationale for 
regulating information services, which promotes wider access 
to broadband services.97 
Had the FCC acknowledged years ago that public access to 
information services might trigger conflicts not readily resolved 
by the marketplace, the Commission would have been able to 
retain limited and nonintrusive jurisdiction to respond to 
complaints. Telecommunications and information markets and 
technologies have converged, and it is now more difficult for the 
FCC to determine the exact scope of its lawful jurisdiction and the 
line between regulated telecommunications services and 
unregulated information services. Rather than acknowledge the 
  
about-level-3s-peering-dispute.html; Level 3 Releases Statement to Clarify Issues in 
Comcast/Level3 Interconnection Dispute, BUSINESSWIRE (Dec. 3, 2010, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101203005375/en/Level-3-Releases-Statement-
Clarify-Issues-ComcastLevel. 
 94 The FCC attempted to downplay the significance of its order and the 
burdens it imposed: 
By comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic measures, the costs associated 
with the open Internet rules adopted here are likely small. Broadband providers 
generally endorse openness norms—including the transparency and no blocking 
principles—as beneficial and in line with current and planned business practices 
(though they do not uniformly support rules making them enforceable) Even to 
the extent rules require some additional disclosure of broadband providers’ 
practices, the costs of compliance should be modest. 
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 59, at 17,928. 
 95 Notice of Appeal, Verizon v. FCC (No. 11-1355) (D.C. Cir. 2011). A previous 
appeal was dismissed as premature/unripe because the final rules had not appeared in 
the Federal Register. Verizon v. FCC, Nos. 11–1014, 11–1016, 2011 WL 1235523 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 4, 2011). 
 96 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006) (applying regulations to wireless 
commercial mobile radio service operators using Title III that generally address 
broadcast spectrum use). 
 97 See id. § 1302. 
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need to make ad hoc determinations and to resolve conflicts, the 
Commission blithely assumed that a competitive marketplace 
would provide solutions to consumers and remedies to any and all 
problems. Such reliance comes across as misguided, particularly 
in light of the conflicts the FCC has faced involving Internet 
access and how to justify its intervention. 
Ironically, even as the FCC appears to have abandoned 
oversight of information services completely, it has devised a 
judicially approved model for asserting jurisdiction over a new 
hybrid service that combines telecommunications and 
information services: VoIP. The Commission has established an 
extensive body of decisions on what obligations VoIP service 
providers must undertake to serve the public interest. Bear in 
mind that many of these obligations impose significant costs on 
VoIP carriers, thereby reducing their competitiveness and 
ability to offer a cheaper alternative to existing wired and 
wireless services. Although VoIP arguably constitutes a type of 
information service,98 the FCC has managed to avoid having to 
make that determination even as the Commission requires 
VoIP operators to incur the same obligations as Title II–
regulated common-carrier telephone companies.99 VoIP service 
providers that can receive or deliver calls to conventional wired 
and wireless networks must contribute to universal service 
funding programs designed to promote affordable dial-up 
telephone service;100 make arrangements to support subscriber 
  
 98 VoIP customers initiate and receive calls via their broadband links, e.g., 
DSL and cable modem services. The FCC considers broadband access an information 
service. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (Mar. 15, 2002) (declaratory ruling and notice 
of proposed rulemaking), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3. It 
follows that software and other applications carried via information-service links 
similarly qualify as information services. 
 99 The FCC has managed to avoid making a specific regulatory classification 
of VoIP, despite having imposed Title II regulatory requirements: 
To date, the Commission has not classified interconnected VoIP service as 
either an information service or a telecommunications service. The 
Commission has, however, extended certain obligations to providers of such 
service, including local number portability, 911 emergency calling capability, 
universal service contribution, CPNI protection, disability access and TRS 
contribution requirements, and section 214 discontinuance obligations. 
In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4582 (Feb. 9, 2011) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (citations omitted).  
 100 In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518, 7538 
(June 27, 2006) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending 
section 254(d) permissive authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to 
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access to emergency 911 service;101 cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities;102 incorporate the technical 
accommodations for persons with disabilities,103 such as deaf 
callers; support the ability of existing subscribers to keep their 
existing telephone numbers when switching services;104 and 
report service outages to the Commission. 105 
The FCC can impose consumer-oriented safeguards on 
VoIP service providers based on a more persuasive and better-
articulated assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. Because VoIP 
competes with conventional wired and wireless services subject to 
Title II regulation, the Commission can impose the very same 
requirements on VoIP carriers despite the lack of specific Title II 
authority.106 Reviewing courts have affirmed the Commission’s 
jurisdiction as well as its preemption of the states from imposing 
a different regulatory regime, or none at all.107 But success in 
selectively regulating VoIP service does not extend to other 
information services because a less-direct impact on a regulated 
service exists and also because of the FCC’s summary conclusion 
that all information services qualify for deregulation.  
B. Eliminating Common Carrier Duties  
The FCC has streamlined and even deregulated some 
telecommunications services based on criteria contained in the 
  
contribute to the USF), reh’g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding 
Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 101 In re IP-Enabled Servs., 20 FCC Rcd. 10,245 (June 3, 2005) (first report 
and order and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 102 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband 
Access & Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,989 (Sept. 23, 2005) (first report and order and 
further notice of proposed rulemaking).  
 103 In re IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 11,275 (June 15, 2007) (report and 
order); In re IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 18,319 (Oct. 9, 2007) (order and public 
notice seeking comment) (granting in part and denying in part waivers of the FCC 
order); see also In re Contributions to the Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, 26 
FCC Rcd. 3285 (Mar. 3, 2011).  
 104 In re Telephone Number Requirements for IP Enabled Services Providers, 
22 FCC Rcd. 19,531 (Nov. 8, 2007) (report and order, declaratory ruling, order on 
remand, and notice of proposed rulemaking); In re Matters of Local Number Portability 
Porting Interval and Validation, 25 FCC Rcd. 6953 (May 20, 2010) (report and order) 
(establishing short deadlines for conversions).  
 105 The Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Outage 
Reporting to Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and Broadband 
Internet Service Providers, PS Docket No. 11-82, FCC 12-22 (Feb. 21, 2012) (report and 
order), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-22A1.doc. 
 106 In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4582 (Feb. 9, 2011) (notice 
of proposed rulemaking and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (citations omitted).  
 107 Vonage Holding Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 
994 (D. Minn. 2003) (upholding FCC preemption of state VoIP regulation). 
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Telecommunications Act108 and, more broadly, in light of 
expanded competition. In many instances the Commission 
wisely has forborne from applying conventional “command and 
control,” “heavy-handed” regulation in light of carriers’ ability 
to self-regulate and consumers’ ability to pursue service 
options.109 However, the Commission has accelerated the 
deregulatory glide path in some market segments based on 
wishful thinking and flawed assessments of the robustness and 
sustainability of competition.110 The markets for equipment,111 
  
 108 Section 10 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 160 (2006), requires the FCC to forbear from any statutory provision or regulation if 
the Commission determines that:  
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the 
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that 
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and 
reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement 
of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers; 
and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with 
the public interest. 
47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006). In making such determinations, the Commission must also 
consider “whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote 
competitive market conditions.” Id. § 160(b). Section 160(d) specifies, however, that 
“[e]xcept as provided in section 251(f) . . . the Commission may not forbear from 
applying the requirements of section 251(c) or 271 . . . until it determines that those 
requirements have been fully implemented.” Id. § 160(d). Section 332(c) of the 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c), authorizes the Commission to refrain or 
forbear from enforcing any provision other than the core requirements of sections 201, 
202, and 208, which respectively require just and reasonable charges, practices, 
classifications, and regulations, prohibit unreasonable discrimination and carrier 
practices, and require the FCC to investigate complaints. 
 109 See Earthlink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming the FCC’s 
decision to forbear from imposing most local loop unbundling requirements on incumbent 
carriers); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the 
FCC’s nationwide decision to refrain from requiring § 251 unbundling fiber broadband 
elements and reversing the Commission’s decision not to eliminate other unbundling 
requirements in light if the adverse impact on carrier investment incentives).  
 110 The FCC previously did not even require applicants for regulatory 
forbearance to demonstrate how marketplace conditions specifically supported less 
government oversight: 
We acknowledge that we have not previously required petitioners to specify in the 
petition how the requested relief meets each of the three forbearance criteria, and 
that a requirement to do so will burden applicants to the extent that they must 
develop their supporting arguments in advance of filing. We do not, however, 
consider this an unreasonable expectation, and we find that the benefit to both 
commenters and the Commission of clarity and precision outweighs the burden on 
the petitioner of explaining how forbearance from each regulation or statutory 
provision meets each prong. 
In re Petition to Establish Procedural Requirements to Govern Proceedings for Forbearance 
Under Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 24 FCC Rcd. 9543, 9551 
(June 29, 2009) (report and order) [hereinafter Forbearance Criteria Order].  
 111 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 
F.C.C.2d 420 (June 26, 1968) (decision); In re Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 
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wiring located on customers’ premises,112 and long-distance 
telephone services113 provide clear examples of prudent 
regulatory streamlining. But similar initiatives for the first-, 
last-, and middle-mile services114 that link end users with major 
  
(Feb. 5, 1974), aff’d sub nom. N.C. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976); In 
re Mebane Home Telephone Co., 53 F.C.C.2d 473, 474 (June 4, 1975), aff’d sub nom. 
Mebane Home Tel. Co. v. FCC, 535 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Pub. Util. Comm’n 
of Tex. v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting long established FCC policy that 
carriers and non-carriers alike have a federal right to interconnect to the public telephone 
network in ways that are privately beneficial if they are not publicly detrimental). 
Previous FCC opposition to this principle failed to pass muster with a reviewing court 
that interpreted the Communications Act as mandating the right of consumers to attach 
equipment to the network in ways that were privately beneficial but not publicly harmful. 
Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). “The intervenors’ 
tariffs [prohibiting the use of a plastic device to enhance privacy and low volume 
conversations], under the Commission’s decision, are in [sic] unwarranted interference 
with the telephone subscriber’s right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are 
privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.” Id. at 269. 
 112 In re Detariffing the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring, 
Second Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg. 8498 (Mar. 12, 1986). 
 113 “In recent years, the FCC has sought to facilitate greater competition in 
the provision of both long-distance and local telephone service.” WorldCom, Inc. v. 
FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing AT&T v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Nat’l Rural Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see also In re Policy and Rules Concerning 
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations 
Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (Nov. 28, 1980) (first report and order); In re MTS and WATS 
Market Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (Feb. 28, 1983) (report and order); In re Access 
Charge Reform, 15 FCC Rcd. 12,962 (May 31, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and 
remanded in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313 (5th 
Cir. 2001); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier 
Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (Jan. 16, 1981). 
 114 The FCC categorizes Internet access into three types based on 
geographical location and function: 
Today, the Internet has evolved from its early stages and is comprised of three 
types of interconnected networks. The first category, Backbone Providers, supply 
long-distance high-speed “connections between a small number of interconnection 
points.” Second, there are Middle-Mile Providers who supply regional distributive 
functions; for example, a connection from a Backbone Provider to a distant city’s 
central office maintained by an ISP. Finally, there are Last-Mile Providers who 
connect Middle-Mile Providers to end users (consumers). Although ISPs were 
historically considered Last-Mile Providers, it is often the case for broadband 
capable networks that the ISP is both the Last-Mile Provider and the Middle-Mile 
Provider. This system of connected networks is most analogous to a road system: 
Backbones represent interstate highways; Middle-Mile networks are the 
intrastate highways; and Last-Mile networks are the local roads that ultimately 
reach consumers. 
Cody Vitello, Network Neutrality Generates Contentious Debate Among Experts: Should 
Consumers Be Worried?, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 513, 518 (2010) (citations omitted). 
Middle-mile facilities are shared assets for all types of last-mile access. As such, 
the cost analysis is very similar regardless of last-mile infrastructure. The local 
aggregation point can vary based on technology (e.g., a cable headend, LEC 
central office or a wireless mobile switching center (MSC)) while the Internet 
gateway is a common asset. Middle-mile facilities are widely deployed but can be 
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broadband long-haul networks exemplify premature 
abandonment of regulatory safeguards in light of the onset of 
little competition, particularly in rural areas.115 
  
expensive in rural areas because of the difficulties of achieving local scale, thereby 
increasing the investment gap. On a per-unit basis, middle-mile costs are high in 
rural areas due to long distances and low aggregate demand when compared to 
middle-mile cost economics in urban areas. While there may be a significant 
affordability problem with regard to middle-mile access, it is not clear that there 
is a middle-mile fiber deployment gap. 
In re Connect America Fund, 25 FCC Rcd. 6657, 6842 (Apr. 21, 2010) (notice of inquiry 
and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 115 The FCC’s conclusions about broadband competitiveness has generated 
substantial opposition:  
The course the Commission has followed over the past eight years has turned out 
to be spectacularly wrong in all of those aspects. There is little to no competition 
for broadband services in the residential and “middle mile” markets. As a result, 
U.S. consumers pay higher rates for services with slower speeds than do 
consumers in other industrialized nations. Our record of online innovation has 
slowed to a crawl. The U.S.’s standing in the world ranking of broadband adoption 
falls continually. (One can look at various rankings and dispute any given 
position, but the trend in all of them is clear. America is clearly falling behind.)  
Public Knowledge, Media Access Project, The New America Foundation & U.S. PIRG, 
Comments In re A National Broadband Plan for our Future, in Practising Law Inst., 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 993 
PLI/Pat 149, 176-77 (2010).  
The reason the U.S. is falling behind can be traced directly to the decisions the 
Commission made over the past 10 years to reclassify broadband service, taking it 
out of the environment of Title II while moving it into the more legally murky 
area of Title I by classifying broadband as an “information service” instead of as a 
“telecommunications service.” Now is the time to recognize that this deliberate 
decision to deregulate by redefinition failed to produce the promised land of 
“intermodal competition” and reverse that decision. 
Id. at 177. 
Rural broadband networks are fundamentally similar to broadband networks in 
other areas in that, in order to have broadband access to the Internet, they must 
include local access, or last-mile, broadband access to the end user and backhaul, 
or middle-mile, capabilities to an available Internet peering point. The last-mile 
network connects residential and business end users to a local ISP. In this 
configuration, the middle-mile or backhaul component connects the local ISP to 
an Internet peering point or node. In rural settings, either or both of these 
components may not support robust broadband connectivity.  
Rural Broadband Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 12,791, 12,828 (Oct. 19, 2009) (public notice) 
(citations omitted); cf. Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572 F.3d 903, 908 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (deferring to the FCC’s expertise in deeming middle mile markets 
sufficiently competition). But see also Data Requested in Special Access NPRM, 25 FCC 
Rcd. 15,146 (Oct. 28, 2010) (public notice) (seeking more data about the nature and 
scope of middle mile competition); In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local 
Exchange Carriers, 20 FCC Rcd. 1994, 1995 (Jan. 31, 2005) (order and notice of 
proposed rulemaking); Parties Asked to Refresh Record in the Special Access Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd. 13,352 (July 9, 2007); Parties Asked to Comment 
on Analytical Framework Necessary to Resolve Issues in the Special Access NPRM, 24 
FCC Rcd. 13,638, 13,639 (Nov. 5, 2009) (public notice). 
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In three instances of streamlined regulatory oversight 
discussed below, the FCC eliminated statutory duties to deal, 
which, in turn, short-circuited both the prospect for true 
facilities-based competition and effective judicial review.116 In 
its zeal to eliminate common-carrier regulations, based on a 
questionable finding of robust and sustainable competition, the 
FCC has abandoned requirements that local exchange carriers: 
(1) provide market entrants interconnection with their 
switching and routing facilities on congressionally mandated 
favorable terms and conditions;117 (2) separate their basic 
transmission facilities from services that provide 
enhancements to these basic transmission links;118 and (3) 
refrain from offering end-user retail services at rates below the 
wholesale rate offered other carriers.119  
In all three instances the FCC eliminated regulatory 
requirements based on the view that they were not needed to 
ensure that consumers could acquire diverse services at 
competitive rates. After failing to convince the FCC that such 
streamlining did not serve the public interest, consumer 
advocates and recent market entrants were similarly 
unsuccessful at convincing appellate courts that the Commission 
erred in its fact finding.120 On two separate occasions the Supreme 
Court has stated clearly that if the FCC determines that no 
regulatory safeguards are necessary, then reviewing courts 
  
 116 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 117 In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 16,983 (Aug. 21, 2003), vacated and 
remanded in part, aff’d in part, U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 
2004); In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2534 (Feb. 4, 
2005) (order on remand). 
 118 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 385-86 (May 2, 1980) (final 
decision), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules & 
Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 962 (June 16, 1986) (report 
and order), vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on 
remand, In re Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards, 
6 FCC Rcd. 174 (Dec. 17, 1990) (notice of proposed rulemaking and order), rule 
modification, 6 FCC Rcd. 7571 (1991), vacated in part and remanded, California v. 
FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, In re Computer III Further Remand 
Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, 10 FCC Rcd. 
5692 (Apr. 25, 1995) (order).  
 119 Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,868; Pac. Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 439-40 (2009) (inferring no duty to 
deal based on FCC determination of sufficient broadband competition). 
 120 For example, a reviewing court did not question the FCC’s conclusion that 
a sufficiently competitive market existed for telecommunications services linking end 
users with ISPs and other service providers. Ad Hoc Telecomm. Users Comm. v. FCC, 
572 F.3d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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should not second guess the Commission and therefore should not 
apply a more rigorous antitrust standard or duty to deal.121 Thus, 
if the FCC overstates the competitiveness and regulatory 
capability of telecommunications-service markets, recent case 
precedent states that appellate courts will not correct the 
Commission’s mistakes but instead summarily validate the 
Commission’s determination that such carriers have no duty to 
deal with other carriers.  
1. Abandonment of Local Loop Unbundling 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996122 sought to 
stimulate local exchange service competition by creating a 
combination of specific common-carrier responsibilities on 
telecommunications carriers123 with additional requirements on 
the Bell Telephone companies that were spun off from AT&T in 
1984.124 In exchange for satisfying a fourteen-point competitive 
checklist,125 the spun-off Bell Telephone companies could seek 
FCC authorization to provide long-distance telephone services, 
a line of business prohibited since AT&T’s divestiture.126 
Included in that list was a requirement that they provide 
network access on an à la carte or combined basis at rates well 
below what the incumbent carriers would seek to charge even 
at wholesale.127 Congress hoped that the Bell companies’ entry 
  
 121 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 410 (2004); Linkline, 555 U.S. at 450.  
 122 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996). 
 123 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (duties applicable to all telecommunications 
carriers). 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(3) requires all telecommunications to 
provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a 
telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an 
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions 
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 
252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such 
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to 
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service. 
 124 47 U.S.C. § 271 (duties that the Bell telephone companies must satisfy to 
qualify for the opportunity to pursue prohibited lines of business such as most long 
distance telephone services).  
 125 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 Section 271 Long Distance Application 
Summary of 14 Point Competitive Checklist, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ 
Common_Carrier/News_Releases/1999/nrc9101b.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 126 Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 127 The Supreme Court did not dispute the right of Congress to require the 
FCC to create new rate-setting methods with an eye toward expediting market entry in 
the local exchange marketplace: 
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into long-distance services would further stimulate competition 
in that market. Congress also believed that the interconnection 
requirements imposed on these carriers would jump-start local 
service competition.128 But over time, the Bell companies faced a 
robustly competitive long-distance telephone service market 
with low margins and less-than-desired upside business 
opportunities.129 The mandated promotional pricing of local 
exchange facilities stimulated market entry by new competitive 
local exchange carriers (CLECs), but sustainable, long-term 
competition by facilities-based carriers did not result.130  
  
The Act thus appears to be an explicit disavowal of the familiar public-utility 
model of rate regulation (whether in its fair-value or cost-of-service incarnations) 
presumably still being applied by many States for retail sales, see In re 
Implementation of Local Competition in Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,857, ¶ 704 (1996) (First Report and Order), in favor of novel 
ratesetting designed to give aspiring competitors every possible incentive to enter 
local retail telephone markets, short of confiscating the incumbents’ property. 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 489 (2002). 
 128 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required incumbent local exchange 
carriers to cooperate with market entrants. 
Until the 1990’s, local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly. States 
typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local service area to a local 
exchange carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops (wires 
connecting telephones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their 
destinations), and the transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) 
that constitute a local exchange network. Technological advances, however, have 
made competition among multiple providers of local service seem possible, and 
Congress recently ended the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act), Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 
56, fundamentally restructures local telephone markets. States may no longer 
enforce laws that impede competition, and incumbent LECs are subject to a host 
of duties intended to facilitate market entry.  
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Pub. Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). 
 129 The long distance toll service marketplace has become robustly competitive 
with low profit margins. 
Until the 1970s, AT&T had a virtual monopoly on long distance service in the 
United States. In the 1970s, competitors such as MCI and Sprint began also to 
offer long distance service. With the gradual emergence of competition, basic rates 
dropped, calling surged, and AT&T’s dominance declined. More than 1,900 toll 
companies now offer long distance service of which more than 1,400 are wireline 
carriers. These carriers remain subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. The 
Commission, however, has chosen to rely on competition, rather than regulation, 
as much as possible. Thus, the Commission forbears from regulating most aspects 
of long distance service.  
FED. COMMC’NS COMM., INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV. WIRELINE COMPETITION 
BUREAU, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, 2010 WL 3806371 (2010) (tracking declining 
revenues and increased competition for inter-LATA toll service). 
 130 Legislative and FCC attempts to promote local exchange competition failed:  
It was both the intent of Congress and the target of intense and sustained FCC 
efforts to open up the incumbent local exchange carriers’ (ILECs) local access lines 
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Frustrated by the combination of low long-distance 
margins and the ongoing duty to bolster the market share of 
newcomers, incumbent carriers sought judicial relief. Initially, 
even the Supreme Court favored the FCC’s interpretation of 
the ‘96 Act’s requirements. The Court determined that the FCC 
could lawfully require promotional pricing that used a costing 
model which justified access prices well below existing 
wholesale rates131 instead of actual, current, and already-
incurred costs. Similarly, the Court held that such mandatorily 
low interconnection rates did not constitute an unconstitutional 
taking of incumbent-carrier property because the carriers 
never proved that any undertaking resulted in a financial loss, 
only less-than-desired financial gains.132 However, the Court 
and other lower appellate tribunals later agreed that the FCC’s 
interconnection pricing mandate lacked sufficient calibration to 
ensure that the promotional pricing only occurred where 
absolutely necessary to jump-start competition.133 As time 
  
to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) who could then compete against 
the ILECs for “last mile” services without having to build their own access lines. 
Seldom have the forces of public policy in telecommunications been as powerfully 
aligned as they were on the issue of local-loop unbundling. And yet, the effort was a 
failure-the evidence for which is the demise of the CLECs. The reasons for this 
failure are clear: (i) the interface between the regulated monopoly owning the local-
access line and the CLECs who wished to use it was highly complex; and (ii) the 
ILECs not only owned the local loops, they also competed in the retail market for 
access services with the very CLECs who had to use their facilities. The result was 
that ILECs had every incentive to make life miserable for the CLECs in any way 
they could, and the complexity of the interface gave them plenty of opportunity. 
Gerald R. Faulhaber, Will Access Regulation Work?, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 37, 40-41 (2008).  
 131 Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 535 U.S. at 468-69. 
 132 In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court rejected 
ILECs’ arguments that using a theoretical, most-efficient-cost model, instead of actual 
historical costs, constituted a taking that violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court 
noted that no party had disputed any specific rate established by the FCC’s forward-
looking, long-run incremental cost-pricing methodology, and concluded that 
“[r]egulatory bodies required to set [just and reasonable] rates . . . have ample 
discretion to choose methodology.” Id. at 499. Additionally the Court stated that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not specifically require historical costs, 
particularly in light of its explicit prohibition on the use of conventional “‘rate-of-return 
or other rate-based proceeding’ . . . which has been identified with historical cost ever 
since Hope Natural Gas was decided.” Id. at 499-500; see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa 
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (largely upholding the FCC’s implementation of the 
Congressional mandate contained in Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 as a reasonable exercise of its rulemaking authority, including its requirement 
that ILECs unbundle network elements and offer CLECs the opportunity to pick and 
choose from an à la carte menu or platform of elements). 
 133 See, e.g., United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (rejecting the FCC’s local exchange network unbundling requirements as 
insufficiently calibrated); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 578-85 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (again reversing the FCC for failing to create local requirements based on the 
specific level of local competition). 
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passed, and as many market entrants did not fully migrate 
from reselling incumbent carrier services to operating their 
own networks, reviewing courts became less deferential to the 
FCC’s precompetitive initiatives. Several appellate courts 
eventually rejected the FCC’s national pricing mandates based 
on the conclusions that Congress only required incumbent 
carriers to offer such rates in localities where the absence of 
such a financial catalyst would impair the onset and 
sustainability of competition.134 
Reviewing courts grew weary with the ongoing role of the 
FCC, not only in the matter of whether and how a carrier must 
interconnect with a competitor but also the terms, conditions, 
and rates of such interconnection. The courts were persuaded 
that the FCC’s pricing methodology might bolster artificial 
competition, sustainable only because the FCC was all but 
guaranteeing a margin between the low rates incumbent 
carriers had to charge and the higher retail rates CLECs could 
charge customers.135 The courts also became persuaded that the 
FCC’s pricing methodology removed incentives for CLECs to 
  
 134 Appellate courts required the FCC to limit precompetitive initiatives to 
that perceived as minimally necessary to achieve success: 
[T]he purpose of the [1996 Telecommunications] Act is not to provide the widest 
possible unbundling, or to guarantee competitors access to ILEC network 
elements at the lowest price that government may lawfully mandate. Rather, its 
purpose is to stimulate competition-preferably genuine, facilities-based 
competition. Where competitors have access to necessary inputs at rates that 
allow competition not only to survive but to flourish, it is hard to see any need for 
the Commission to impose the costs of mandatory unbundling. 
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 576 (ordering elimination of all unbundling 
requirements for access to long distance and CMRS carriers). 
 135 Reviewing courts determined that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
sought to promote competition by allowing market entrants the temporary option of 
profitably reselling incumbent carrier services. 
We also made clear that the Commission’s broad and analytically insubstantial 
concept of impairment failed to pursue the “balance” between the advantages of 
unbundling (in terms of fostering competition by different firms, even if they use 
the very same facilities) and its costs (in terms both of “spreading the disincentive 
to invest in innovation and creating complex issues of managing shared 
facilities”) . . . . 
Id. at 563 (identifying flaws in the FCC’s unbundling requirements and why the court 
previously required more nuanced and granular precompetition requirements); see also 
Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the 
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999); 
Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak, & David J. Teece, Innovation, Investment, and 
Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, 
Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885 
(2003); Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 315 (2005). 
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migrate from the resale of incumbent carrier facilities to making 
their own investments in new infrastructure.136 In response, the 
FCC exempted new technologies from any unbundling 
requirement and established dates for the elimination of 
interconnection and preferential access pricing for CLECs.137 
2. Elimination of Structural Safeguards  
The FCC also eliminated structural separation rules. 
These rules required incumbent carriers with market power to 
create one or more separate subsidiaries to pursue markets 
that add value to and enhance basic leased lines.138 These 
requirements, articulated in the FCC’s First and Second 
Computer Inquires,139 sought to establish a bright line between 
basic telecommunications services and the array of 
enhancements that evolved into what are now called 
information services. The Commission sought to create a level, 
competitive playing field between ventures unaffiliated with a 
carrier providing basic network access and an information-
service affiliate of the basic network-providing carrier.140 
  
 136 Reviewing courts determined that the FCC correctly refused to mandate 
sharing of competitively used facilities: 
We therefore uphold the Commission’s rules concerning hybrid loops, FTTH, 
and line sharing on the grounds that the decision not to unbundle these 
elements was reasonable, even in the face of some CLEC impairment, in light 
of evidence that unbundling would skew investment incentives in undesirable 
ways and that intermodal competition from cable ensures the persistence of 
substantial competition in broadband.  
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 585. 
 137 In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2535-36 
(Feb. 4, 2005) (order on remand). Cf. In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for 
Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan 
Statistical Area, 25 FCC Rcd. 8622 (June 22, 2010) (memorandum opinion and order) 
(finding insufficient competition to justify further regulatory streamlining). 
 138 Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,855; see also 
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules & Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C. 2d 958 (1986) (report and order), vacated sub nom. 
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on remand, Computer III Remand 
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards, 6 FCC Rcd. 174 (1990) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking and order), rule modification, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), vacated in part and 
remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, Computer III 
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Order, 
10 FCC Rcd. 5692 (1995). 
 139 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 (May 2, 1980) (final 
decision), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 
(D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 140 For background on the FCC’s Computer Inquiries, see Robert Cannon, The 
Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. 
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Structural separation prevented facilities-based incumbent 
carriers from offering preferential interconnection terms and 
conditions to corporate affiliates.141 
Carriers subject to the separate-subsidiary requirement 
and other safeguards that mandated functional separation 
between basic and enhanced services bristled at these 
requirements. They believed that the requirements were both 
unnecessary and costly.142 Over time, these carriers succeeded 
in persuading the FCC to abandon these safeguards despite 
never proving how such requirements resulted in lost efficiency 
and synergy.143 Bear in mind that the complaining carriers 
  
COMM. L.J. 167 (2003); Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in 
Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered 
Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 (2003). 
 141 See Robert M. Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the 
Communications/Information Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 70-71 (1981); 
Robert M. Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 383, 389 (1987).  
 142 Incumbent carriers framed the separate subsidiary requirement as 
unnecessary and inefficient. 
Parties supporting the removal of the structural separation requirements for the 
provision of enhanced services by AT & T and BOCs argue that, in the current 
telecommunications environment, the costs of those requirements outweigh their 
benefits. On the cost side of the equation, they contend that structural separation 
has imposed substantially greater burdens on the affected carriers, and 
ultimately on the public, than anticipated when we established those 
requirements in Computer II. In particular, a large number of parties assert that 
structural separation has deprived the public of innovative services that could be 
provided efficiently through AT & T’s and the BOCs’ extensive communications 
networks and thus made available to a large number of potential customers. 
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common 
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 978-88 (1986); 
on reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987); 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987); Memorandum Opinion 
and Order on Further Reconsideration, In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the 
Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988); 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, In re Amendment of Sections 
64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 3 F.C.C.R. 
1150 (1988), rev’d and remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 
1990), on remand, In re Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company 
Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange Company Safeguards, CC Docket 90–623, 6 
F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), partially aff’d and partially rev’d sub nom. California v. FCC, 4 
F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993), 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 143 The FCC abandoned structural separation requirements based on carrier 
assertions of lost operational synergy and efficiency:  
The following factors guide us toward replacing the Computer Inquiry obligations 
for wireline broadband Internet access service providers with a less regulatory 
framework: the increasing integration of innovative broadband technology into the 
existing wireline platform; the growth and development of entirely new broadband 
platforms; the flexibility to respond more rapidly and effectively to new consumer 
demands; and our expectation of the availability of alternative competitive 
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willingly created separate subsidiaries to provide “yellow page” 
directory advertising and wireless services,144 perhaps because 
such separateness accrued tax benefits and some degree of 
insulation from having to compensate the parent carrier for 
access to existing billing and database-management systems. 
Even as the FCC eliminated local loop unbundling 
(LLU) and structural safeguards, national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) in other nations have embraced them.145 
Carriers facing such obligations have not experienced financial 
distress and the competitive environment has shown measureable 
  
broadband transmission to the currently required wireline broadband common 
carrier offerings. We believe our actions today will enhance each of these factors. 
Wireline Broadband Classification Order, supra note 3, at 14,895.  
Deployment to consumers of these technologies then, at best, is delayed and, in 
many cases, may be avoided altogether. Broadband Internet access services are 
also not developing in ways that neatly fall within existing regulatory 
classifications or the current Computer Inquiry requirements (i.e., they cannot be 
easily separated into discrete information service and telecommunications service 
components). As a result, unlike cable modem providers or other broadband 
Internet access service competitors, wireline carriers must make either of two 
less-than-optimal choices when they seek to deploy advanced network equipment: 
either they must decide not to use all the equipment’s capabilities, thereby 
reducing their operational efficiency; or they must defer deployment while the 
manufacturer re-engineers it to facilitate compliance with the Computer Inquiry 
rules, thereby creating unnecessary costs and service delays.  
Id. at 14,887-88. 
 144 For example AT&T divides itself into four subsidiaries, two of which 
provide wireless and directory publishing service:  
AT&T has four main operating segments: wireless, wireline, advertising 
solutions, and other. The wireless segment consists of AT&T’s subsidiary, AT&T 
Mobility, which provides wireless services to both business and consumer 
customers. This segment represents approximately 43 percent of 2009 total 
segment operating revenues. . . . The advertising solutions segment includes 
AT&T’s directory operations, which publish Yellow and White Pages directories 
and sell directory advertising and Internet-based advertising and search.  
In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless for 
Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations and Modify a 
Spectrum Leasing Arrangement, WT Docket No. 09-104, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 8704, 8706 (2010).  
 145 “[E]xperience both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere has indicated 
that, where access to the incumbents’ networks has been allowed, it has provided a 
sound platform for the successful deployment of new services. Many of these new 
services-VoIP is an example-provide a significant source of competition.” Michael H 
Ryan, Promoting Network-Based Competition in UK Fixed-Line Markets: A Failed 
Policy, 5 CONVERGENCE 63, 72 (2009); Bob Bell, Broadband Deregulation—Similar 
Legislation, Different Results: A Comparative Look at the United States and the 
European Union, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 77, 94-98 (2007); ORGANIZATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENTS IN LOCAL LOOP 
UNBUNDLING 5 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/24/6869228.pdf. 
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improvement.146 For example, Britain’s dominant carrier, British 
Telecom, split itself into two firms in 2006, one providing first- 
and last-kilometer access to telecommunications infrastructure147 
and the other offering competitive services. The United Kingdom 
marketplace has become robustly competitive without harming 
incumbent British Telecom’s financial viability and stock 
attractiveness.148 The nations of the European Union continue to 
embrace structural separation and LLU. Other nations with LLU 
requirements include Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
South Africa, Australia, and Hong Kong.149 
  
 146 Many national regulatory authorities endorse local loop unbundling as a 
vehicle for stimulating competition and expediting development of next generation 
broadband networks: 
Korea has acquired world-class broadband internet services through a successful 
combination of industrial and competition policy. From the start, the Ministry of 
Information and Communication aggressively pursued industrial policy in the 
sector, but without stifling competition. It fostered competition in the market by 
lowering entry barriers and intervening to prevent KT from gaining too much of a 
competitive edge. It also adopted a local loop unbundling strategy to address 
concerns about unfair competition. The success of the government’s broadband 
internet strategy is apparent in the penetration ratio . . . . What can we learn 
from this Korean example? At an early stage of development, the government 
recognized the need for fundamental infrastructure. As an industrial policy 
measure, it required market entrants to install their own facilities while helping 
to create the market conditions that would make this affordable. Later, after 
sufficient facilities had been set up throughout Korea, the government changed 
tack and began to enforce an “essential facilities” doctrine that rested on local loop 
unbundling. This enabled new entrants to secure a foothold in an established 
market on a competitive basis. This demonstrates that under certain 
circumstances industrial policy can function alongside competition policy to 
achieve an ultimate economic policy goal, without producing undesirable side 
effects from a competition policy perspective.  
Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea’s Competition Law and Policies in 
Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 687, 719-20 (2006); see also CHRISTINE ZHEN-WEI 
QIANG, BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN STIMULUS PACKAGES: RELEVANCE 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/28282
2-1208273252769/Broadband_Investment_in_Stimulus_Packages.pdf; What Is Local Loop 
Unbundling?, OFCOM, http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/broadband/dsl_ 
facts/LLUbackground.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); EWAN SUTHERLAND, LINK CENTRE, 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, UNBUNDLING LOCAL LOOPS: GLOBAL EXPERIENCES 
(2007), available at http://link.wits.ac.za/papers/LINK.pdf; Paul W.J. de Bijl & Martin Peitz, 
Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges, COMM. & 
STRATEGIES, 1st Qtr. 2005, at 33, 35-50, available at http://www.idate.fr/fic/revue_telech/ 
414/CS57_BIJL_PEITZ.pdf. 
 147 See OPENREACH, KEEPING THE UK CONNECTED 4-6 (2008), available at 
http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/home/aboutus/downloads/web_corp_brochure.pdf. 
 148 Liz Tay, BT: Functional Separation Was a Success, IT NEWS (Nov. 4, 2009, 12:17 
AM), http://www.itnews.com.au/News/159659,bt-functional-separation-was-a-success.aspx; 
see also OFCOM, COMMUNICATIONS MARKET REPORT 15-16 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/753567/CMR_2010_FINAL.pdf.  
 149 See Network Unbundling, INFODEV, ICT REGULATION TOOLKIT 4.5.5 (Dec. 28, 
2011), http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.3426.html; Robert W. Crandall, 
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3. Courts Infer the Absence of a Common Carrier Duty 
to Deal 
Appellate courts have determined that there is no 
antitrust remedy if the FCC has relaxed its oversight of carrier 
interconnection terms and conditions based on its expert 
assessment of marketplace competition. Put another way, if the 
FCC determines that the scope of competition is sufficient to 
trigger abandonment of regulatory safeguards, reviewing 
courts have no basis to second guess the Commission. In 
application, this means that reviewing courts have great 
reluctance to impose more burdensome safeguards than what 
the FCC, in its expert judgment, has deemed unnecessary. 
Verizon v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko150 resolved 
uncertainty about whether antitrust claims can exist based on 
the obligations imposed on ILECs by the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 and, if so, whether individual customers have 
standing to assert such claims. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, limited to the question of whether the court of 
appeals erred in reversing the district court’s dismissal of the 
respondent’s antitrust claims.151 
The Court held that the “savings clause” contained in 
the ‘96 Act152 does not foreclose application of antitrust laws to 
ILEC behavior. However, the Court noted that such inclusion 
in the text of the Communications Act does not provide 
significantly greater scrutiny of or safeguards against 
anticompetitive practices. The relaxation of existing regulatory 
oversight performed by the FCC and state regulatory agencies 
does not create a mandate for new antitrust safeguards for 
courts to enforce: 
But just as the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy existing 
antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond 
existing antitrust standards; that would be equally inconsistent with 
  
Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Robert E. Litan, Vertical Separation of Telecommunications 
Networks: Evidence from Five Countries, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 493 (2010). 
 150 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  
 151 See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 
2d 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing antitrust claims), aff’d in part, vacated in part and 
remanded, 294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-7746), as superseded, 305 F.3d 89 
(2002), cert. granted in part sub nom. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP, 538 U.S. 905 (2003). 
 152 “Section 601(b)(1) of the 1996 Act is an antitrust-specific saving clause 
providing that ‘nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be 
construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust 
laws.’” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406 (citing 110 Stat. 143, 47 U.S.C. § 152). 
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the saving clause’s mandate that nothing in the Act “modify, impair, 
or supersede the applicability” of the antitrust laws.153 
Having concluded that the ‘96 Act does not foreclose 
antitrust cases, the Court easily rejected the applicability of 
the Sherman Act to a claim that Verizon discriminated against 
competitors when they sought access to individual, unbundled 
network services provided by Verizon: 
We conclude that Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance in the 
provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under 
this Court’s existing refusal-to-deal precedents. This conclusion would 
be unchanged even if we considered to be established law the “essential 
facilities” doctrine crafted by some lower courts, under which the Court 
of Appeals concluded respondent’s allegations might state a claim.154 
The Court concluded that both the FCC and state 
regulatory agencies can investigate claims that an ILEC had 
failed to comply with ‘96 Act requirements and, in turn, can 
impose financial penalties, remediation measures, and 
additional reporting requirements for noncompliance: 
Finally, we do not believe that traditional antitrust principles justify 
adding the present case to the few existing exceptions from the 
proposition that there is no duty to aid competitors. Antitrust 
analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and 
circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to 
economic context is an awareness of the significance of regulation.155 
The Supreme Court’s deference to the FCC’s 
deregulatory campaign has gone so far as to allow an 
incumbent carrier to engage in predatory price squeezing, or to 
offer end users lower rates than what it charges competitors.156 
In 2003, several ISPs filed suit against Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. contending that the company attempted to monopolize the 
market for DSL broadband Internet access by creating a price 
squeeze where ISP competitors were obligated to pay a higher 
wholesale price than what Pacific Bell offered on a retail 
basis.157 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed that the ISPs could present their price squeeze 
claim, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trinko.  
  
 153 Id. at 407. 
 154 Id. at 419. 
 155 Id. at 411. 
 156 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 449-55 (2009). 
 157 Id. at 443-44. 
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The Supreme Court assumed that Pacific Bell had no 
antitrust duty to deal with any ISPs based on the FCC’s premise 
that ample facilities-based competition existed.158 Curiously, the 
Court did not mention that Pacific Bell could have avoided a 
unilateral duty to deal with ISPs based on the FCC’s conclusion 
that DSL, and presumably its component parts, constituted 
information services and not common-carrier-provided 
telecommunications services. But for a voluntary concession to 
secure the FCC’s approval of AT&T’s acquisition of another 
ILEC, the Court noted that Pacific Bell would not have a duty 
even to provide ISPs with wholesale service.159 The Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the narrow question of whether ISP 
plaintiffs can bring a price-squeeze claim under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act when the defendant carrier has no antitrust-
mandated duty to deal with the plaintiffs.160 The lower courts 
concluded that the Trinko precedent did not bar such a claim, 
but the Supreme Court reversed this holding.161 
On procedural grounds, the Court’s decision chided the 
ISP plaintiffs for changing the nature of their claim from a 
price squeeze to one characterizing Pacific Bell’s tactics as 
predatory pricing.162 On substantive grounds, the Court noted 
  
 158 “DSL now faces robust competition from cable companies and wireless and 
satellite services.” Id. at 443. 
 159 “As a condition for a recent merger, however, AT & T remains bound by the 
mandatory interconnection requirements, and is obligated to provide wholesale ‘DSL 
transport’ service to independent firms at a price no greater than the retail price of AT 
& T’s DSL service.” Id. 
 160 “We granted certiorari, 554 U.S. 916, . . . to resolve a conflict over whether 
a plaintiff can bring price-squeeze claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act when the 
defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiff.” Id. at 435-46. 
 161 The Court supported the theoretical possibility that an antitrust claim 
could survive in a deregulated environment. 
Our grant of certiorari was limited to the question whether price-squeeze claims 
are cognizable in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal. The Court of Appeals 
addressed only AT & T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the plaintiffs’ 
original complaint. For the reasons stated we hold that the price-squeeze claims 
set forth in that complaint are not cognizable under the Sherman Act. 
Id. at 455-56. 
 162 The Court noted that the plaintiffs appeared to have shifted their claim 
from Pacific Bell engaging in a price squeeze to one alleging predatory pricing. 
This case has assumed an unusual posture. The plaintiffs now assert that they 
agree with Judge Gould’s dissenting position that price-squeeze claims must meet 
the Brooke Group requirements for predatory pricing. They ask us to vacate the 
decision below in their favor and remand with instructions that they be given 
leave to amend their complaint to allege a Brooke Group claim. In other words, 
plaintiffs are no longer pleased with their initial theory of the case, and ask for a 
mulligan to try again under a different theory. 
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that a new emphasis on predatory pricing would have required 
determination of whether the retail price was set below cost,163 a 
claim the ISPs did not make. The Court determined that the 
case did not become moot because of the change in economic 
and antitrust arguments.164 But the decision evidences great 
skepticism as to whether the ISPs had any basis for a claim. In 
the Court’s reasoning, the ISPs failed to make a claim that 
Pacific Bell’s retail DSL prices were predatory, and the ISPs 
also failed to refute the Court’s conclusion that Pacific Bell had 
no duty to deal with the ISPs (i.e., to provide wholesale 
service).165 The Court could apparently ignore the voluntary 
concession AT&T made that created a duty to deal because that 
concession may have triggered FCC oversight, but the 
concession could not change whether an antitrust duty to deal 
arose. The Court read the Trinko case as foreclosing any 
antitrust claim if no antitrust duty to deal exists.166  
The Court remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether the ISP plaintiffs had a viable predatory 
pricing claim.167 The Court expressed the need for clear 
  
Id. at 446. 
 163 The Court referenced Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), which supports the inference that a predatory pricing claim 
can be established only with proof of below-cost pricing coupled with evidence that the 
defendant can subsequently recoup any lost profits. Linkline, 555 U.S. at 446-47. 
 164 The Court determined that a shift in framing what anticompetitive 
practice occurred did not by itself render the claim moot. 
We do not think this case is moot. First, the parties continue to seek different 
relief. AT & T asks us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint at issue. The plaintiffs ask 
that we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions that they be given 
leave to amend their complaint. The parties thus continue to be adverse not only 
in the litigation as a whole, but in the specific proceedings before this Court. 
Linkline, 555 U.S. at 446. 
 165 “The challenge here focuses on retail prices—where there is no predatory 
pricing—and the terms of dealing—where there is no duty to deal.” Id. at 449. “If there 
is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, 
then a firm is certainly not required to price both of these services in a manner that 
preserves its rivals’ margins.” Id. at 452. 
 166 “In this case, as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with 
its rivals at wholesale; any such duty arises only from FCC regulations, not from the 
Sherman Act.” Id. at 450. 
 167 The Court remanded the case for lower court determination whether a 
viable antitrust claim existed. 
It is for the District Court on remand to consider whether the amended complaint 
states a claim upon which relief may be granted in light of the new pleading 
standard we articulated in Twombly, whether plaintiffs should be given leave to 
amend their complaint to bring a claim under Brooke Group, and such other 
matters properly before it. 
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antitrust rules and apparently viewed consumer access to low 
retail prices—predatory or not—as sufficient reason for courts 
to refrain from intervening. Remarkably, the Court did not 
seem troubled by the threat of all ISPs’ competitors exiting the 
market, an event that surely would enable the surviving 
incumbent carrier to raise rates: “For if AT&T can bankrupt 
the plaintiffs by refusing to deal altogether, the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate why the law prevents AT&T from putting them 
out of business by pricing them out of the market.”168 
This case evidences a strong reluctance on the part of the 
Supreme Court to support any review over the pricing strategies 
of carriers. Presumably the plaintiffs could have petitioned the 
FCC to review the broadband wholesale prices, but the 
Commission could have claimed that it had no jurisdiction to 
investigate because the DSL service at issue constituted an 
information service not subject to Title II pricing and 
nondiscrimination requirements.169 In light of the regulatory 
objectives contained in the ‘96 Act, which the Court deemed 
“much more ambitious than the antitrust laws,”170 more powerful 
safeguards against anticompetitive practices already exist. The 
Court opted not to second guess why the FCC refrained from 
using its lawful authority to remedy an obvious price squeeze. 
C. Eliminating Cellular Radio Spectrum Caps  
In 2003, the FCC eliminated a cap on the amount of 
spectrum a single wireless telecommunications carrier can 
acquire based on a determination of ample competition.171 
  
Id. at 456.  
 168 Id. at 456-57. 
 169 The holding in Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), and the reversal of the FCC’s attempt to 
sanction Comcast for meddling with subscribers’ use of cable modem broadband links, 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), confirm that the FCC has no 
direct statutory mandate to regulate the terms and conditions by which a carrier offers 
information services including DSL.  
 170 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 415 (2004). 
 171 Despite evidence to the contrary, the FCC concluded that a robustly 
competitive wireless telecommunication market existed: 
Measures of market concentration in the record show a substantial continuing 
decline in concentration in most local CMRS [commercial mobile radio service] 
markets. We find that considerable entry has occurred and that meaningful 
competition is present, particularly given the presence of such earmarks of 
competition as falling prices, increasing output, and improving service quality and 
options. Specifically, concentration in CMRS markets, as measured by subscriber 
share, is falling. 
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Coupled with the Commission’s approval of each and every 
merger application it had received,172 the Commission all but 
guaranteed a concentrated marketplace for wireless services.173 
In light of increasing reliance on wireless services to serve all 
consumers’ information, communications, and entertainment 
requirements, the FCC should have concluded that such 
consolidation would adversely affect the level of competition 
and the public interest. Advocates for merger approval have 
heralded efficiency gains from scale, the possibility of increased 
employment, spectrum scarcity, and extraordinary growth in 
demand for services.174 To these advocates, a spectrum cap 
would prevent a single carrier from satisfying demand and a 
proliferation of carriers presumably would not be able 
collectively to achieve such goals. 
When it removed the spectrum cap, the FCC made 
summary assertions without using any serious or rigorous 
analysis about the consequences. The Commission never 
considered that removing a spectrum cap would eliminate an 
  
In re 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial 
Mobile Radio Services, 16 FCC Rcd. 22,668, 22,682 (Dec. 18, 2001) (report and order). 
The FCC rejected as a significant barrier to market entry the need to acquire spectrum, 
in light of the Commission’s view that resale opportunities would suffice.  
Nonetheless, there are factors that moderate concern regarding the spectrum 
access barrier to entry. In particular, the need for direct access to spectrum is not 
absolute because carriers can compete in the provision of CMRS without direct 
access to spectrum through resale, or a mobile virtual network operator 
(“MVNO”) arrangement.  
Id. at 22,690.  
 172 See, e.g., In re Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and 
Atlantis Holdings LLC, 23 FCC Rcd. 17,444, 17,546-47 (Nov. 10, 2008); In re Applications 
of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. and Cingular Wireless Corporation for Consent to 
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, 19 FCC Rcd. 21,522, 21,626 (Oct. 26, 
2004); see also Archive of Major Transactions, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/ 
major-transactions-archive (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  
 173 The FCC’s most recent statistics show that in 2009 the top four wireless 
carriers in the United States served 90.42 percent of all subscribers and generated 
93.25 percent of all revenues. Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market 
Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, 26 
FCC Rcd. 9664, 9697, tbl.4, Service Provider Share of Subscribers and Revenues (Year-
End 2009) (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth report).  
 174 See, e.g., Acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc. by AT&T Inc. Description of 
Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, Comment from 
AT&T, Inc. to the FCC (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/ 
document/view?id=7021240421; In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom 
AG, Comments of Communications Workers of America to the FCC (May 31, 2011), 
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021681259; In re Applications 
of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG, Joint Opposition of AT&T Inc., Deutsche Telekom 
AG, and T-Mobile USA, Inc. to Petitions to Deny and Reply to Comments to the FCC (June 
10, 2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021686831. 
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ex ante safeguard that helps prevent anticompetitive 
consequences before harm has occurred. Arguably, ex ante 
safeguards are more essential in light of the Commission’s 
elimination of common-carrier duties to deal and case law that 
all but eliminates antitrust remedies.175 As a basis for 
comparison, other nations, including the United Kingdom, 
support spectrum caps in the mobile wireless marketplace. The 
UK’s telecommunications regulator has acknowledged that 
high barriers to entry and the potential for excessive 
concentration176 justify spectrum caps:  
We also propose to put in place safeguard caps to guard against longer 
term[] risks to competition from very asymmetric holdings of 
spectrum. While we do not think that spectrum needs to be held 
equally for there to be effective competition or equality of opportunity 
to compete, we do think that there could be a risk if some national 
wholesalers held a very large share of mobile spectrum. While it is 
difficult to speculate about future possible developments, we consider 
it is possible that in the longer term there could be technological (e.g. 
beyond LTE) or market developments that meant that very 
asymmetric holdings of spectrum represented a risk to competition, 
especially for sub-1 GHz spectrum.177 
  
 175 In light of the substantial deregulation that has occurred, the remaining 
regulatory oversight provides essential safeguards. 
[A] sector regulator can introduce ex ante means, of which spectrum caps are one 
example, to help ensure that markets remain truly competitive. To the extent that 
policy makers believe they should have a portfolio of ex post and ex ante measures 
at their disposal to facilitate and ensure effective competition in markets for the 
sake of users, consumers, and overall welfare, then both a sector regulator in 
telecommunications and a Competition Authority have valuable roles to play. 
Martyn F. Roetter, Mobile Broadband, Competition and Spectrum Caps, ARTHUR D. LITTLE 21 
(Jan. 2009), http://hspa-titian.profissionhosting.com/upload/news/files/05032009134807.pdf. 
 176 The United Kingdom telecommunications regulatory authority considered 
it essential to impose spectrum caps on wireless carriers: 
We consider that if we put in place no measures in the combined award to 
promote competition, there is a material risk of an outcome that would lead to 
lower competitive intensity in the provision of higher quality data services 
compared to competition in the wholesale market today, and compared to what 
might be possible. This is because we consider there is a material risk of only two 
or three national wholesalers emerging from the auction capable of providing 
higher quality data services in a profitable way. This is especially the case given 
that there are high barriers to entry to the national wholesale market, including 
the difficulty of obtaining access to suitable spectrum. 
Ofcom, Consultation on Assessment of Future Mobile Competition and Proposals for 
the Award of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz Spectrum and Related Issues 45 ¶ 5.58 (Mar. 22, 
2011), available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/combined-
award/summary/combined-award.pdf [hereinafter Ofcom Future Mobile Consultation]. 
 177 Id. at 49, ¶ 5.83. 
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Only recently, with 91.2 percent of the wireless market 
controlled by four national carriers, has the Commission begun 
to express doubts about whether concentration in the wireless 
marketplace generates sufficient competition.178 Previously the 
Commission expressed no concern that incumbent carriers 
would acquire the lion’s share of any newly available spectrum. 
For example, in the auctions for choice 700 MHz spectrum, 
which were made available when television broadcasters 
converted to digital transmissions, the two largest incumbent 
carriers, AT&T and Verizon, spent $16 billion of the $19.6 
billion collected by the U.S. government.179 
  
 178 With an eye toward providing better fact-based assessments of industry 
competitiveness, the FCC’s recent reports on the wireless marketplace use a more 
sophisticated and granular assessment:  
[R]ather than reaching an overarching, industry-wide determination with respect 
to whether there is “effective competition,” the Report complies with the statutory 
requirement by providing a detailed analysis of the state of competition that seeks 
to identify areas where market conditions appear to be producing substantial 
consumer benefits and provides data that can form the basis for inquiries into 
whether policy levers could produce superior outcomes.  
In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, 25 FCC Rcd. 11,407, 11,411, 11,407 (May 20, 2010) (fourteenth report) 
[hereinafter 14th Wireless Competition Report]. The Commission largely disputes its 
previous determinations of robust competition. For example, in 2006 the FCC reported 
that despite having approved a major merger, “[e]ven with one less nationwide mobile 
telephone carrier to choose from, U.S. consumers continue to benefit from robust 
competition in the CMRS marketplace.” In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive 
Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 21 FCC Rcd. 10,947, 
11,029 (Sep. 29, 2006) (eleventh report). More recent Commission reports are less 
confident about the sufficiency of competition: “Over the past five years, concentration 
has increased in the provision of mobile wireless services. The two largest providers, 
AT&T and Verizon Wireless, have 60 percent of both subscribers and revenue, and 
continue to gain share (accounting for 12.3 million net additions in 2008 and 14.1 million 
during 2009).” Id. at 11,412. The Commission uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to 
measure wireless industry concentration and reports that the current figure of 2848 
exceeds the 1800 figure used by the Department of Justice to identify “highly 
concentrated” industries. See id. at 11,451-55; see also Annual Report and Analysis of 
Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial 
Mobile Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9697, Table 4, Service Provider Share of 
Subscribers and Revenues (Year-End 2009) (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth report).  
 179 AT&T and Verizon acquired the most spectrum and bid the most money in 
the FCC’s auction of 700 MHz wireless spectrum: 
According to an analysis by The Associated Press, the two telecom companies bid 
more than $16 billion, constituting the vast majority of the overall $19.6 billion 
that was bid in the FCC auction. With Verizon Wireless and AT&T dominating 
the auction so completely, hopes that the auction would allow for the creation of a 
new nationwide wireless service provider were dashed.  
W. David Gardner, Verizon, AT&T Big Winners in 700 MHz Auction, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 
20, 2008), http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/showArticle.jhtml?articleID 
=206905000; see also Saul Hansell, Verizon and AT&T Win Big in Auction of Spectrum, 
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In light of the Commission’s favorable treatment of 
merger requests, AT&T Wireless applied to acquire T-Mobile.180 
AT&T claimed the merger would help it abate a severe 
spectrum shortage and promote the company’s ability to 
provide wireless broadband services to rural locales on an 
accelerated basis.181 The company had sought to shift attention 
from the market-concentrating impact of the merger because 
acquiring T-Mobile’s 14 percent market share would boost 
AT&T’s share to over 40 percent, which, combined with 
Verizon’s share, would result in two companies controlling 
almost 80 percent of the market.182 AT&T sought to frame the 
merger as a means for the company to improve customer 
service and to compensate for delays in FCC regulatory reform, 
especially the Commission’s inability to make more spectrum 
available for wireless services.183 
AT&T’s now failed merger with T-Mobile184 constitutes an 
exception to a long list of approved mergers made possible by the 
FCC’s removal of a spectrum cap. Had the Commission retained 
the cap, the wireless marketplace may today have had more 
competition, innovation, and consumer choice. The four major 
carriers do not deviate significantly from a business model that 
offers subscribers a subsidized handset in exchange for a two-
year service commitment and a hefty financial penalty for early 
termination of service.185 Wireless carriers charge rates that 
contribute to the recoupment of the handset subsidy and 
subscribers have few options for cheaper service if they activate 
  
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/technology/21auction.html; 
Factsheet for Auction 73, FCC (Mar. 20, 2008), http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ 
default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=73.  
 180 See Acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc. by AT&T Inc. Description of 
Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, supra note 174. 
 181 “As we have shown, AT&T is facing severe capacity constraints in markets 
throughout the United States, and this merger is the surest and most efficient solution 
to those constraints.” Id. at 5. 
 182 See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9697 tbl.4 (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth 
report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-103A1.doc 
[hereinafter 15th CMRS Competition Record]. 
 183 See Response of AT&T Inc. to Information and Discovery Request Dated May 
27, 2011 to the FCC (June 10, 2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/ 
view?id=7021687006.  
 184 See Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom Ag for Consent to Assign 
or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, DA 11-1955 (order) (Nov. 29, 2011). 
 185 For example, compare AT&T Wireless service plans, AT&T: PLANS, 
http://www.wireless.att.com/businesscenter/plans/index.jsp?wtLinkName=Plans&wtLi
nkLoc=MNB&WT.svl=2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2012), with the nearly identical terms and 
conditions available from Verizon Wireless, VERIZON WIRELESS: CELL PHONE PLANS, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/plans.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
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a used and unsubsidized handset. Had the spectrum cap 
remained in force, perhaps one or more carriers would have 
pursued a different business plan, maybe concentrating on data 
services and offering an open interface to content and software 
instead of the tightly controlled access erected by the four major 
carriers and handset manufacturers such as Apple.  
U.S. wireless carriers claim they must aggressively 
compete by offering consumers world-class service in terms of 
monthly minutes of use, price, and innovation.186 On the positive 
side, the carriers correctly report that their rate plans offer large 
baskets of voice minutes and—at least until recently—unlimited 
data access plans.187 Additionally, carriers typically offer services 
that do not debit the monthly usage allotment when a subscriber 
calls another subscriber of the same carrier.188 On the other 
hand, U.S. wireless carriers offer services with nearly identical 
price points. Service terms do not stimulate competition and 
innovation even as these carriers generate some of the world’s 
highest margins and average revenue per user (ARPU).189 
Provided subscribers do not deviate from relatively narrow, 
carrier-defined usage parameters, both carriers and customers 
can benefit. However, one can only speculate how much more 
robust, innovative, and dynamic the industry could have become 
had the FCC retained the spectrum cap. 
Instead, the FCC overstates the positive benefits 
accruing from an increasingly concentrated industry. By using 
carrier-provided estimates of ARPU, average minutes of use, 
  
 186 U.S. wireless carriers claim they operate in a robustly competitive and 
innovative marketplace: 
American consumers are the world’s wireless winners because today’s wireless 
ecosystem has evolved into a virtuous cycle of innovation and fierce competition. 
The U.S. regulatory approach has enabled American consumers to benefit from 
better value and more cutting-edge wireless products and services than 
consumers in other countries. Due to flexible, market-driven policies, the U.S. 
wireless industry is the most innovative and competitive. We are the example 
that other countries try to emulate. 
Innovation and Competition, CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/ 
policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/64 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 187 See, e.g., Wireless Industry Innovation: We’re #1, CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N 
BLOG (June 14, 2011), http://blog.ctia.org/2011/06/14/wireless-industry-innovation-were-1/ 
(compiling a list of industry leading accomplishments by U.S. wireless carriers).  
 188 “One of the main benefits of choosing an AT&T Mobile Phone Plan is 
unlimited calls to other AT&T wireless mobile users.” AT&T Wireless Phone Service, 
AT&T, http://www.att-services.net/att-wireless.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
 189 “The average monthly subscriber bill (ARPU) in the United States, at 
$51.54, is much higher than the Western European average of $33.45.” 14th Wireless 
Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,619. 
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and cost-per-minute of service, the FCC has reported a mostly 
happy story about the U.S. wireless marketplace. Only recently 
has the Commission started to acknowledge the highly 
concentrated nature of the wireless marketplace.190 The 
Commission has generally dismissed any problems drawn from 
credible and frequently used measures of severe industry 
concentration. Factoring in Verizon’s $28 billion acquisition of 
Alltel, a company with a 5.2 percent market share, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) generated a concentration 
score of 2848, well above the 1800/2500 figure that triggers a 
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission “highly 
concentrated” market finding.191 Apparently for wireless 
markets, other factors support a decision not to worry about 
the HHI score, including the availability of many subsidized 
handsets, non-price rivalry, and the $3.4 billion the four major 
wireless carriers spent on advertising in 2009.192 Additionally, 
the FCC has reported to Congress that CMRS carriers have at 
least 586 MHz of spectrum available.193 However, a close 
examination of the frequency bands identified by the 
Commission generates questions whether carriers can offer a 
  
 190 The FCC belatedly has begun to acknowledge how concentrated the U.S. 
wireless marketplace has become: 
In the mobile wireless services industry, the weighted average of HHIs (weighted 
by population across the 172 Economic Areas in the United States) was 2811 at 
the end of 2009, compared to 2842 at the end of 2008. Both the lowest HHI values 
and the highest HHI values by Economic Area decreased in 2009 relative to 2008. 
From 2003 (the first year the Commission calculated HHIs) to 2009, the average 
HHI has increased from 2151 to 2811, an increase of 660 points. As of mid-2010, 
the weighted average of the HHIs has increased to 2848, slightly higher than the 
year-end 2008 level. 
15th CMRS Competition Record, supra note 182, at 9679. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing the 
squared market shares of all firms in any given market, is a commonly used 
measure of industry concentration. Antitrust authorities in the United States 
generally classify markets into three types: Unconcentrated (HHI < 1500), 
Moderately Concentrated (1500 < HHI < 2500), and Highly Concentrated 
(HHI > 2500). 
Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf).  
 191 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/ 
15.html. In April 2010, the Justice Department and the FTC raised the concentrated industry 
floor to a 2500 HHI level. 14th Wireless Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,451. 
 192 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9748 (June 27, 2011) (fifteenth report); 
see also 14th Wireless Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,491-92. 
 193 14th Wireless Competition Report, supra note 178, at 11,566. 
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functionally equivalent service option based on propagational 
characteristics of the available spectrum and company business 
plans. For example, Clearwire, a company identified as 
providing a competitive alternative to CMRS, concentrates on 
data services to users and only offers VoIP service to users with 
wireless-modem-equipped, portable computers. The company 
does not provide a functional and competitive alternative to 
mobile services accessible via small handsets like those used by 
CMRS subscribers.194 
III. CONCLUSION 
National regulatory authorities such as the FCC 
typically have a statutory duty to serve the public interest and 
to recalibrate the nature and scope of their oversight when 
circumstances change. Technological innovations surely 
promote the possibility of more competition, but the 
countervailing trends of convergence create incentives for 
incumbents to diversify and serve new markets while 
expanding in size and scale. The cross-currents of potentially 
greater competition, but also consolidation of control by 
incumbents, should motivate NRAs to streamline regulations 
with caution and on an incremental basis. The FCC did not 
embrace this course of action and opted instead to make 
expansive deregulatory pronouncements based largely on 
nonempirical, overly optimistic assessments about the future 
sustainability of existing and future competition. 
In the four case studies examined in this article, the 
FCC has identified problems necessitating its intervention or 
reassessment, but the Commission’s prior acts now prevent it 
from crafting quick and lawful solutions.195 When it opted to 
  
 194 Clearwire’s web site specifies that the carrier provides service to laptop 
computers, not handsets: “The CLEAR 4G modem plugs into your laptop for the 
ultimate high-speed connection. Stream movies and videos across your city, video chat 
at the park, download files on-the-go and much, much more.” CLEAR INTERNET, 
http://internet.clear.com/mobile-broadband.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).  
 195 The Commission rarely has the inclination or authority to undo a 
streamlined regulation in light of changed circumstances. A rare exception occurred 
when the Commission approved the merger of Sirius and XM satellite digital audio 
radio services (SDARS).  
At that time, the Commission agreed that market forces produced by the robust 
competition between two SDARS competitors would ensure that listeners would 
receive noncommercial educational and public interest programming on the 
SDARS service. In the absence of such competitive forces post-merger, we find the 
potential harm to programming diversity greater than was the case in 1997.  
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apply unconditionally the information-services classification to 
all types of broadband Internet access, the FCC abdicated its 
authority even to resolve legitimate complaints of 
discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct. When it freed 
Title II–regulated common carriers of many core 
responsibilities—such as the duty to cooperate with 
competitors on fair terms, conditions, and prices—the 
Commission made it possible for reviewing courts to conclude 
that these carriers no longer had a duty to deal with each other 
subject to FCC oversight. Even a blatantly anticompetitive 
practice, such as offering retail rates below the wholesale rate 
offered to a competitor, does not trigger a judicial remedy 
because reviewing courts can defer to the FCC’s expert 
conclusion that marketplace competition would discipline 
carriers and offer readily available and cheaper alternatives to 
carriers’ engaging in price squeezes. When the FCC eliminated 
spectrum caps, it allowed incumbent carriers to achieve 
necessary scale, but also to benefit from extraordinarily high 
barriers to market entry all but guaranteeing a concentrated 
market, which is compounded by lax merger review. 
The FCC has executed a strategy that favors 
incumbents best equipped to exploit streamlined or eliminated 
regulation for private gain. The competition identified or 
predicted by the Commission has failed to reach effective and 
sustainable levels. Rather than imposing so-called heavy-handed 
regulations, the FCC has removed regulatory safeguards that 
would require scrutiny of incumbents’ efforts to achieve market 
dominance, including tactics that might constitute unfair trade 
practices and violations of competition policies.  
Only recently has the FCC changed its approach and 
recognized anticompetitive conduct and market concentration. 
The FCC has determined that it should resolve complaints 
regarding the allegedly anticompetitive practices of certain ISPs. 
The Commission no longer reports to Congress that the mobile 
wireless marketplace unconditionally operates with effective 
competition,196 or that Americans enjoy ubiquitous access to 
  
In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, 23 FCC Rcd. 
12,348, 12,413 (Aug. 5, 2008) (memorandum opinion and order and report and order).  
 196 The FCC no longer unconditionally concludes that the U.S. wireless 
marketplace evidences effective competition:  
[W]e find that the mobile wireless ecosystem is sufficiently complex and multi-
faceted that it would not be meaningful to try to make a single, all-inclusive 
finding regarding effective competition that adequately encompasses the level of 
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competitive broadband services.197 Additionally, the Commission 
has launched a reassessment of whether middle-mile 
telecommunications links between end users and carriers are 
priced at competitive levels.198 The Commission apparently now 
sees the need to impose duties to deal fairly and on reasonable 
terms and conditions even for carriers who claim regulatory 
streamlining exempts them from government oversight. 
It remains to be seen whether and how the FCC can 
maneuver around all the consumer-protection tools it has 
abandoned. Already courts have rejected the Commission’s 
creative and novel invocations of ancillary jurisdiction in lieu of 
direct statutory authority. Had the Commission acted 
cautiously it would have lost the ability to make a big 
deregulatory pronouncement, but years later it would be in a 
position to act when needed. 
Sadly, remedies for the FCC and the nation cannot arrive 
anytime soon, because Congress appears unable to reach 
consensus on necessary amendments to the Communications Act 
of 1934. Whether and how the FCC should regulate has become 
a contentious issue based largely on economic and political 
philosophy and not empirical evidence.199 The FCC needs a clear 
statutory basis to provide public-interest safeguards for 
consumers of information services and to make sensible and 
limited retreats from several deregulatory initiatives. Such 
reassessments would not signal a resumption of intrusive and 
potentially harmful regulation. Instead the FCC would have 
clear legislative authority to assess the current state of 
telecommunications and information-service markets and to 
make midcourse corrections in the scope of deregulation. 
Absent new statutory authority the FCC will continue 
to struggle with no certainty whether an assertion of ancillary 
  
competition in the various interrelated segments, types of services, and vast 
geographic areas of the mobile wireless industry.  
15th CMRS Competition Report, supra note 182, at 9691. 
 197 The FCC states that “that broadband is not being deployed in a reasonable 
and timely fashion to all Americans.” Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 
and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement 
Act, GN Docket No. 10-159, FCC 11-78, ¶ 1 (May 20, 2011) (seventh broadband 
progress report and order on reconsideration). 
 198 In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4676 (Feb. 9, 2011) (notice 
of proposed rulemaking and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (seeking comment 
on reasons for high middle mile costs and whether to use universal funding support to 
expand capacity and reduce price).  
 199 See generally Frieden, supra note 26, at 277-312. 
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jurisdiction will pass muster with a reviewing court. The 
Commission has achieved success in applying what it considers 
necessary consumer safeguards for VoIP, but similar efforts to 
curb ISP anticompetitive practices have failed. The 
Commission lacks clear guidance on the reach of its jurisdiction 
at the very time it needs to provide guidance to stakeholders, 
particularly ones that use the Internet to serve as a medium 
for a combination of voice, data, and video services. 
